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What are the aims of Charles de Gaulle for France? Where is she heading? And how will her policies affect the rest of the world? In this issue, six authors offer very varied views of de Gaulle and his Fifth Republic. Arguing that de Gaulle is not rational, our introductory author urges Americans to "examine the contention that he has spent his life in a single-minded campaign to gain complete control of France, and explore the uses to which he . . . would be likely to put the power he has seized by a lifetime of inhuman effort."

Megalocracy in France

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THE ONLY THING more dangerous than underestimating an opponent is to misunderstand him; and with Charles de Gaulle, we seem intent on doing both. A month after his sixteenth press conference as President of the Fifth Republic on November 27, 1967, there was little indication of any widespread recognition of its real significance. Speaking to the assembled representatives of the French and foreign press in the grand ballroom of the Elysee Palace, ostensibly in response to presubmitted questions but actually in what has become recognized as a semi-annual state of the nation address from the throne, General de Gaulle discussed not only the prosperity and stability of France but the difficulties and disorders of his old comrades-in-arms, "les Anglo-Saxons." His tone ran from haughty complacency to scathing contempt to brutal malevolence reaching a chilling climax in the calculated revival of political anti-Semitism.

The immediate public reaction was shocked incredulity; and the very difficulty of assimilating the implications of such a message

drove journalists to irrelevance. For what percentage of the French did the General speak, they asked the computers of the country's two public opinion institutes. But not only were the issues too complex for meaningful punch-card formulation, the problem was not quantitative but legal: General de Gaulle speaks for France. Next they speculated about how long he was likely to remain in power. Admitting the uncertainties involved, he himself had suggested five more years (the remainder of his presidential term) which closed off easy escape in that direction. Above all, they protested his malign resurrection of anti-Semitism. Few, however, even asked why he had spoken as he did or how far or in what ways he would attempt to translate his words into deeds.

The text itself was clear enough. After an initial flourish of self-congratulation, the General denounced the monetary policies of Britain and the United States, at once denying any part in the recent attack on the pound and threatening another offensive aimed ultimately at the dollar. From there, he turned

to the Middle East, to attack Israel for aggression and imperial ambitions. While claiming an impartial concern for peace, he reaffirmed France's centuries' old friendship for the Arabs and concluded with an ominous reference to the difficulty of establishing a permanent settlement in that area under United Nations auspices so long as one of the greatest powers "would not disengage itself from the hateful war it was conducting elsewhere." Leaping then to Canada, he protested the fate of French Canadians in terms reminiscent of Hitler's campaign to liberate the Sudeten Germans, complete with another jab of the anti-Semitic needle. Next, in a passing compliment to Poland, he recognized her western frontiers, "without wishing, the least in the world, to offend our German friends," just to be sure they didn't miss the point. Turning back to Britain, he spelled out his determination to obstruct her entry into the Common Market until she accomplished such a vast and far-reaching mutation of her economy that her admission would strengthen the Market against the power of the United States. The conference closed fittingly with further self-congratulation, this time for the regime that after 177 years had finally brought stability to France through the President of the Republic, "the only mandatory of the entire French people."

A plausible summary of this diatribe might read that to give expression to an unlimited hatred of the United States, General de Gaulle was preparing to attack us through any interests, friends or allies he could reach, specifically, the British by disputing their economy, the Canadians by disintegrating their Confederation, and the Israelis by causing them to be driven into the sea. The idea that a head of state could threaten the political or economic security of two old allies, who during his own lifetime twice fought for his country's liberation and left over a million dead on her soil, or plot the destruction of a heroic nation built by the survivors of Hitler's "final solution," for no more visible motivation than the personal slights of a man long since dead who was President of still another country, is not merely illogical; it is pro-

foundly disturbing. To escape the ominous implication that our public affairs could be manipulated in such an irrelevant context and to such morbid purposes we instinctively try to clothe the General's naked revelations with scraps of rationality, just as we strove in the past to fill the lacunae left by his silences and evasions with reasonable content.

De Gaulle, we insist with desperate conviction, is wholly devoted to France and his place in her history. No matter how quaint or warped his views may seem, he is a supreme realist who would not risk his country's greatness or his own in senseless or reckless gestures. Actually, the General himself has contributed little except occasional flights of rhetoric to this apologia. Instead, until recently, he continued to hide his aims and motives behind that "thick cloud of deception" about which he has boasted. From his first days in London, however, a series of disillusioned defectors have charged that his driving concern was neither France nor history but his own personal power. Over the years, their allegations have been swept aside as the biased, if not treasonable, testimony of renegades and reactionaries; but concrete evidence of any complexion concerning his motives remains astonishingly scarce.

HERO OF THE LIBERATION

An intense and gifted young man, who seemed to some to harbor illusions of grandeur, Charles de Gaulle made his entry on the stage of history with his broadcast from London on June 18, 1940. After a bitter war waged on two fronts, one against his country's enemies and the other against her allies, he became the unrivaled hero of the Liberation. When, however, his plans for the political future of France were not accepted, he retired; and after losing one major political campaign he waited at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises until the Algerian crisis swept him back—the tried and proven savior. He did terminate the Algerian war, to the relief of most Frenchmen and all friends of France; but in the process, he both betrayed those to whom he owed his return and entrenched himself in power.

Given the circumstances of the time, there may well have been no viable alternative to his solution for Algeria; but the General opened himself to the charge of conniving at and profiting from the destruction of his own supporters, an impression reinforced by his vindictive treatment, through a packed court, of the insurgent generals who, refusing to follow his policy of abandoning loyal Frenchmen, had attempted to overthrow his government by a military coup.

With the reestablishment of peace, de Gaulle moved back to the political front, first providing his own presidential office with a new base in direct popular suffrage and then, in ensuing legislative elections, winning an outright majority in the Assembly. Thus reinforced, he vetoed Britain's first bid for membership in the Common Market and checked the scheduled emergence of independent political powers in that body. But basically he did little until his reelection as President in December, 1965, put him safely beyond the reach not only of any conceivable opposition but of any restraining influence of his own followers and associates as well. With his rear secured, he withdrew from NATO and began his spectacular series of state visits with his trip to Moscow. Following the legislative elections of the spring of 1967 in which his majority was cut, he further tightened his control over this dwindling and restive Assembly by forcing it to vote decree powers to his government. Such, in brief, is the background of the sixteenth press conference.

WHY THREATS?

The question that now confronts us is why, at the end of a long career, marked by unprecedented triumphs, he should suddenly jeopardize both his reputation as a statesman and his country's future by malevolent threats against her principal allies. To admit the possibility that he intends to carry them out is to plunge into the absurd, to reject it is to risk becoming his victims. Under the circumstances, the least we can do is examine the contention that he has spent his life in a single-minded campaign to gain complete control of France, and explore the uses to

which he could or would be likely to put the power he has seized by a lifetime of inhuman effort.

In a century that has produced both Freud and Hitler, we know something about the force and nature of subconscious drives and the vulnerability of modern political institutions to the machinations of a megalomaniac. The inability of the psychically disturbed to distinguish between their own emotional experiences and the external world is generally accepted as a fact of life that should be taken into due account by doctors, social workers, and police. Similarly, the power of neurotics under certain circumstances to channel energies to the achievement of improbable goals is also recognized. Even the pressure for public fulfillment of subconscious needs is understood.

Taken together, these factors serve warning that a modern state with all its incalculable power might become the object of neurotic obsessions and that de Gaulle's record should be reexamined in that light. Hitler, because of the unencompassable enormity of his crimes, and the fanatical support he drew from a large part of the German nation, has been viewed as the personification of ultimate political evil. Actually, however, the essence of his threat may have been more mundane than apocalyptic. Quite possibly the most revealing statement he ever made was that the war would have to come in 1939 or 1940 because he would be "about the right age then."

The fact that Hitler seized and used his power in such abhorrent ways may have distracted us from the fundamental fact that he was attempting to resolve subconscious conflicts through external actions and that he was incapable of distinguishing between the two. Perhaps Lord Acton's famous aphorism should be rephrased to read: "Power attracts neurotics; absolute power attracts absolute neurotics." Certainly the history of the twentieth century would seem to offer abundant evidence that able individuals bent on power had far more than a random chance of seizing it; and modern presidential regimes seem designed to fit their purpose. Indeed,

General de Gaulle designed his own which provides an almost pure example of this megalomaniac perversion of modern government.

POLITICS AND NEUROSIS

Once the hypothesis of "megalo-cracy" is conceded, the realities of politics have to be reexamined as potential symbols of neurotic needs. Carried to any length, this exercise would require professional skills; but psycho-analytical training is not necessary to recognize the possibility, for example, of the nation-state taking on the qualities of the mother. It is alleged that de Gaulle was once asked if France had become his mother and he answered, "But of course!" In such a context, moreover, many of his actions and reactions take on more meaning; his desire for total, sole possession, and his pathological resentment of any foreign presence on her soil, to take two examples. What is needed now, however, is not to analyze the General's subconscious but to acknowledge that he may be operating in a private world and to canvass the consequences such a fact could have for the rest of us who might find ourselves caught in the physical projections of his hallucinations. On the assumption that the General may intend to pursue the course of foreign policy he seems to have laid out, we must attempt to estimate his resources for carrying it through and, conversely, examine the ways in which he might be checked.

To do this is to consider in turn his constitutional prerogatives, his political authority and his popular appeal. In the present situation the constitution provides the keystone of his position. Responsible as President to the entire electorate, he controls the ministry and can dispense with the Assembly. By Article 16, at any time he judges the security or the foreign policy of France to be in danger, he may dismiss the Assembly and rule by decree. Given the country's centralized administration, this means all but unlimited authority; and since there is no provision for removing a president from office, he is a potential dictator throughout his entire mandate.

Although according to the French Consti-

tution, the cabinet is "responsible" to the Assembly, it is in fact the creature of the President. Not only does he appoint its members and preside over their deliberations, but he exacts their total and abject subservience. Composed, with a few exceptions, of fanatical Gaullists like André Malraux and Michel Debré or mere scavenger fish picking the teeth of power, it was never intended to be a policy-making body. Even in a crisis of presidential irresponsibility its members could hardly be looked to for resistance. Such ministerial habitués as Edgar Faure might resign in protest or prudence; but the only conceivable opposition leader would be the Premier himself.

A self-made success, Georges Pompidou came to his high office from the Rothschild Bank without political experience or visible ambitions. Inevitably he was viewed as an emissary of the business world and a potentially restraining influence. In the last two years, however, he has emerged not merely as the apparent heir-apparent to de Gaulle but as a tough and determined contender for the succession. While this inevitably makes him doubly cautious, it also makes him doubly sensitive to the long-range implications or repercussions of the General's policies. In the Assembly debate following the break with NATO, Pompidou took pains to indicate that in spite of his support of the official line, he still favored the Alliance. Thus, even though he has risked no such aside about the sixteenth press conference, it is easy to imagine that it caused him acute discomfort; but that is not to say that further escalation of the General's aberrations would drive him to rebellion. Ministerial resignations are out of style; and for Pompidou such a gesture would be suicide. Envied, hated or feared by the other members of the cabinet, he could count on no support; and even a full governmental crisis would only give the General a welcome pretext to carry out a legal coup by invoking Article 16.

To turn to the National Assembly as a possible base for resistance is also to turn to Pompidou's chief rival for the succession, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Although the As-

sembly has been reduced, through the operation of a disciplined majority, to the status of a debating society, a number of critical votes have been extremely close, suggesting that the balance of power could be reversed. So far the decisive margin has been supplied by 40 Independent Republicans, but Giscard, their leader, has shown increasing restiveness and some feel that he may be approaching the point of open defiance. The youngest major politician in France, he is also considered by many the most brilliant. Minister of Finance before he was 40, he was eased out of the cabinet in the reorganization following the 1967 elections in which he had attracted much attention by his now famous formula, "*oui mais*." Insisting that the maintenance of voting discipline did not necessitate servile compliance, he urged that important issues be discussed and even compromised among the majority.

De Gaulle met this amateurish insubordination with characteristic contempt. He forced Giscard to join in voting decree powers to the new government by the simple threat of a cabinet crisis. The would-be rebel read the consequences and went along, in spite of his imprecations that he would never capitulate again. Just as Pompidou hopes to take over a functioning government, so Giscard counts on gaining control of the existing majority; and he knows that once disrupted it would be all but impossible to reassemble.

Giscard's caution, moreover, will be reinforced by the apprehension that his voting bloc may not be as decisive as it appears. Not only are there unattached votes that might drift into the orbit of the majority; but there is even reason to think the Communists would rally to the Gaullists in a real showdown, not so much to defend the General's foreign policy—although it would be so explained—as to hold off the growing threat of the new united Left. The Communist party bureaucracy in France is fighting for its existence and must realize that the General is its most important rampart. With his disappearance, the Federation¹ should have a good chance of electing François Mitterrand Presi-

dent and might even win a majority of the Assembly. The possibility of an effective government of the Left would pull the Communist electorate out from under the party organization, since most workers are by now more interested in economic gains than tactical victories. From the outside point of view, all of this means that if some new extravagance eventually drives Giscard into opposition, he will not necessarily bring the government down; and even if he does, there is still Article 16!

Moreover, if we look beyond the Assembly to the country at large the prospects are hardly brighter. Resentment and distrust of de Gaulle's behavior mounts; but with no way to force him into another electoral confrontation, it would take a nationwide general strike to give the resentment effective expression. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that anything of the sort is imminent. For one thing, modern affluent societies do not provoke to rebellion easily. Half of any population will remain unaware of, or uninterested in, national policies that do not affect its immediate living standards or conditions, and the General has managed to avoid doing that on any important scale. Furthermore, the French are morbidly sensitive to governmental instability or insecurity. The very threat of mass action—inevitably led by labor—would drive the timid and insecure back to de Gaulle as the only alternative to the chaos he has warned would follow his disappearance.

The only conclusion to be drawn from any such *tour d'horizon* is that it would be utterly unrealistic to expect the General to be forced from office before he had provoked a major crisis. The French will be as reluctant as we to accept the nature and range of his intentions; and if he operates with his habitual skill, thrusting here, retreating there, he will continue to confuse and divide all those around him. In this light, the "little list" of November 27, 1967, takes on an even more sinister tone; and makes it urgent that we reconsider both our own defenses and de Gaulle's resources.

For this purpose the Arab-Israeli impasse will provide a useful example. The inherent

¹ Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left.

dangers of the situation hardly need to be spelled out or underlined. With the unprecedented good will of all concerned and with unlimited good luck, peace may be maintained until some ultimate solution can be arranged. In the meantime, any simple misunderstanding or mistake may plunge the Near East into another conflict. Because of de Gaulle's reversal of an established policy, Israel is deprived of her source of military aircraft and some other arms. The Russians, compounding what they may regard as an original blunder, have largely made good the Arab losses in equipment. And the United States, in spite of its intimate connection with and moral responsibility for Israel, is trying to pretend her security is a matter for United Nations negotiations. Fortunately, the Soviets are probably as reluctant to confront the United States on this issue as we are to become involved; but both the Soviet Union and the United States are prisoners of past mistakes.

The stage could hardly have been better set if Charles de Gaulle had written the script himself. With minimum effort or exposure he can mount a deadly campaign against the Israelis that would force the United States to a disgraceful humiliation or a reckless intervention in still another war. First, France can supply excellent arms of all relevant categories to the Arab states. Second, through the close relations de Gaulle has cultivated with Algeria—the one Arab state with a tough large army—he could influence Arab politics and keep the Israeli issue boiling. An effective buildup could be managed largely behind the scenes, and its real purpose revealed only in the final push. The timing would be flexible; the tactics varied; and the results could be catastrophic. De Gaulle himself has seen a vigorous European population forced to abandon its unequal struggle against Arab numbers and fanaticism and seek inhospitable refuge in foreign lands. It is a model that may hold a special fascination for him.

To understand the General's position fully, however, we have to realize that he is not committed to any single line of action. In

addition to the Near East, there is the Atlantic Alliance which he obviously intends to leave in 1969, but which he could also try to destroy. Cooperation in this venture could become his price for British entry into Europe; and if the Germans proved recalcitrant there would always be Berlin and the threat of French withdrawal. The possibilities are almost endless; and, for him, success in any one would constitute a triumph. Nor would he run the risk of failure. Any reprisals would have to be taken against the French; and forcing the United States to this absurd reaction would itself feed his obsession.

In the quarter of a century that de Gaulle has been preparing his position the United States has been dismantling its own. His unsuspected strength in the international arena depends directly on ill-concealed American weakness. Little of what he has done and less of what he seems to have in mind would have been possible if the United States had continued to exercise the leadership exemplified by the Marshall Plan. Somewhere, however, the United States exchanged statesmanship for counterinsurgency and lost its sense of direction in the forests and politics of Vietnam.

The war in Vietnam is still de Gaulle's main trump. Because of it American character is impugned; American reliability is questioned; American forces are committed; and American currency is vulnerable. The United States has too little remaining influence—moral, military or financial—to pro-

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As this economist appraises the situation, "... the France of de Gaulle is headed toward modernization and the affluent society, with all that this implies in troubles and tribulations."

The French Economy: Down the Up Staircase and Into the Market

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THE GENERAL, the British would perhaps be inclined to agree, is not a very likeable chap, and he seems to enjoy losing friends and influencing people against his vision. Thus there is among onlookers a propensity to exaggerate every downturn in the economic health of his country, and to cry "Wolf!" too often. The year 1967 is a case in point. It was not a very good year for the French economy, but it was not all that bad. It held a mixture of trouble and progress, optimism and occasional alarm and, above all, was a year of careful preparation—painful at times—for the day (July 1, 1968) when all tariff barriers will fall and a somewhat truncated economic Europe will come into being.

For years now, long before the days of President Charles de Gaulle, France has been climbing up the steep staircase leading to modernization and mass consumption. She has, in the General's words, moved resolutely forward to become a modern industrial state, having started her upward journey not from the first floor but from the wine cellar, so to speak. Although with the postwar baby boom, she has rejuvenated herself on the way, France is not a youngster as nations go, and

one should not be surprised if once in a while she stops to catch her breath.

The mild French recession of 1967 seems to have been precisely that kind of a halt. It provided the chief of state with just the needed excuse in April to call for plenary powers, which he received, and to use the decree weapon to deal deftly with two problems having to do with the national purse and the Gaullist vision. The axe fell on the bloated system of social security, but ever so gently, so that even *l'Express*, which surely is not among the General's favorite readings, found itself discoursing philosophically on the fundamental impossibility of the system as it had been.¹ The *Confédération Générale du Travail* (C.G.T.), after calling the measures a "tax on health" and promising to do something about it, left it pretty much at that.

The reform (discussed in more detail below) concerned some 42 million Frenchmen; the profit-sharing scheme—the Gaullist pill meant to sweeten the reform—touched the lives of 5 million wage earners and a half million employers. It, too, occasioned little fuss. Both were administered in August, a time of single-minded rest and recreation for 50 million Frenchmen, including the parliamentarians. The decree measures came, as *l'Express* put it, "*clopin-clopant devant une salle à demi vidée par l'été et les bains de mer.*"² Like much else in the Fifth Republic, the whole action was "in the bag" before the

¹ Compare, for example, the *l'Express* articles on the subject, July 24–30, 1967 (pp. 4–5) and August 14–20, 1967 (pp. 11–15).

² "hobbling in before a House half emptied by summer and the beaches," *L'Express*, August 7–13, 1967, p. 4.

deputies got half a chance to bang their desks. The bright young technocrats spawned it, little groups discussed it in the awesome setting of the Elysée, the press approved or disapproved of it, the labor unions fumed a bit, and the rest of the nation plunged merrily into the sea.

The objections, of course, were mainly political. The nation, said some, was being rapidly depoliticized, not only institutionally, but in its very guts. "And so," commented *l'Express*, "on the day marking the 175th anniversary of the fall of the Ancien Régime, the Chief of State will try to show that he had built a new one."³ The London *Economist* could not agree more:

there is nothing wrong with the French economy to justify the emergency powers which President de Gaulle has taken. . . . There are, though, some awkward bits of short-term adjustment to be faced; and the idea in Paris is to ensure, by strong government, that these are handled without jeopardizing the long-term aims embodied in the national plan.⁴

THE RECESSION

The awkward bits of short-term adjustment were, in fact, made more awkward by bits of bad macroeconomic news. Frenchmen who understand such things were accustomed to seeing the graphs of industrial and agricultural output, employment and Gross National Product (G.N.P.) go up. Since about December, 1966, some of these lines had gone down, others took a horizontal turn, and only a few continued on their upward journey. Frenchmen who do not normally understand such things were quick to grasp that something had gone wrong when they found their vacation train fares up 5 per cent, their gas and electricity more costly, and their meat at what the economists told them was a retail price index of 142 (1962 = 100). Notoriously inadequate, the official employment statistics did nothing to improve the situation. By

September, 1967, unemployment totaled 213,900, about two per cent of the active population (some in the government said unemployment had reached 170,000; others said 300,000).

However, the malady was not so much a question of unemployment, rather it was a problem of regions and age structure. The agricultural west, in the grips of a painful transformation, had an unemployment problem nearer four per cent, a matter rendered more urgent by the slow migration of the poorest farm families. The government had taken measures to speed up the relocation process by paying indemnities to older farmers who had decided to give up their farms and, in this way, to help the drive to consolidate and expand farm holdings. Since 1964, some 95,000 farmers had taken advantage of the offer, apparently only to regret it. The *indemnité de départ* amounts to about \$300 per family—not a grand sum with which to begin life at 60.⁵ Moreover, the whole scheme has been snarled in bureaucratic red tape, so that it looked much better on paper and in economic semantics (*mutations inévitables*) than down on the subsistence farm. In fact, at the present rate, the projected consolidation of farms into viable units in the Common Market sense would take until approximately the year 2,000, and the market is due in July of 1968.

When the trade barriers come tumbling down, there is likely to be serious trouble in Brittany, the Massif Central, and other depressed areas. The guillotine of the open economy will be sharp and swift, its only ethic will be the ability to compete. Between now and then, the government may have second thoughts. Whether these thoughts will prompt it to delay and procrastinate the *mutations inévitables* or to speed up the process is hard to tell. There are still in France some 600,000 small farmers over 60 and the indemnity fund runs only to 1974.

Other troubled areas are the industrial regions of the Nord and Lorraine. Both are dominated by coal, and are in swift decline. The government has retraining programs for the displaced workers but, again, the problem

³ *Ibid.*, July 24–30, 1967, p. 4.

⁴ "France: Why de Gaulle Wants New Powers," *The Economist*, April 29, 1967, p. 476.

⁵ Jean Maquet, "La Condition des Paysans: Plus qu'un Scandale, une Tragedie," *Paris Match*, October 14, 1967, pp. 70–73.

seems to be one of application rather than drafting. What is involved is brought out by figures relating to such retraining programs: since 1964 only 15,000 retraining applications have been accepted by the competent authorities, while about 200,000 people leave the farming profession every year.⁶

COAL SCANDAL?

There is also a slight suggestion of scandal about the coal problem. It would be unfair to say that President de Gaulle is more interested in Quebec than in the Lorraine: his cross testifies to that. But it is fair to say that he is more at home with *idées générales* than with bothersome specifics. In 1959, France produced 59 million tons of coal; in 1966, she has trimmed output to 50 million tons, and plans to produce only 30 million tons in 1975. There are at present about 143,000 miners and 20,000 mining engineers, many of whom will have to be retrained and reemployed in the coming years. In 1968, the cost of retraining may well exceed 1,600 million francs, a tidy sum. While all this goes on, France imports each year 15 million tons of coal, at least one-third of it for political reasons inherited from the past or manufactured in the present as part of de Gaulle's "opening to the East" policy. According to a 1956 treaty, France is obliged to buy one-third of the Saar's annual coal production (about 3 million tons). A 1964 agreement commits her to buying from 1.3 million to 1.9 million tons of coal every year from the U.S.S.R., and a recent agreement calls for another 500,000 to 700,000 tons from Poland. The coal is cheap, to be sure, at least the Polish coal, but it keeps piling up on top of the 5 million tons which France already has in stock. Common Market and United States coal also keeps coming in, with no end in sight.⁷ This makes French miners nervous.

Finally, there is the congested Paris region, the most centralized bit of industrial real

estate in the world. So long as the statisticians' curves went up, the heat of the debate was low. But now matters are different.

The French economy, for all its strengths, is highly susceptible to any virus that may strike the rest of the economic world, especially Germany. There used to be a time when, according to an old adage, Europe got pneumonia each time the United States sneezed. This is no longer the case. It is still true, however, that when Germany has a cold, France catches the flu, and that the bug spreads to Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. French exports constitute 12.5 per cent of France's domestic gross production (1966), and the biggest share of the exports goes to Germany.⁸ Some of the shadows that fell across the French economic landscape in 1967 are no doubt traceable to the German slowdown of 1966. Others, like the stagnation in textiles and the troubles in the shipyards, were the backlash of world crises.

It must be galling to a man of de Gaulle's ambition to preside over an economy so subject to external influences. De Gaulle's barbed remarks about foreign inroads and "American hegemony" are understandable in this light. His cherished priority sector, scientific research (of which France may be justly proud), is slipping through his fingers. In September, 1967, for example, the biggest firm in the government's *plan calcul* (the computer plan) was absorbed by the firm of Thomson-Houston, in part, at least, because it had been forced by government contracts into projects which it would not have dreamed of tackling on a commercial basis. In the long run, de Gaulle may be right, but for the present he is faced with the politically unpleasant reality of paying his way in accordance with the rules of the market game. In his November, 1967, press conference, de Gaulle referred with pride to France's achievements in the field of television research, but the sad fact of the matter is that the French Secam color system, excellent as it is, has been exceedingly costly and difficult to develop. So the rest of Western Europe has opted for America's "Pal," proven by 14

⁶ *Le Figaro*, November 25-26, 1967, p. 4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, November 24, 1967, p. 16.

⁸ Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Situation et Perspectives de l'Economie française en Juillet 1967, *Etudes et Conjoncture*, September, 1967, p. 5.

years of actual working experience, leaving Russia and France to pick up the Secam pieces. *Etatism* and the Common Market do not mix too well, nor does the Gaullist millenium of "pancapitalism" (a blend of labor and capital spiced with profit-sharing for a start), with the General's recent expressions of confidence in and adherence to the forces of the market.

UNEMPLOYMENT

The 1967 unemployment problem was not only regional and demographic but also psychological (minors account for about 63 per cent of crimes committed; about one-third of the offenders are unemployed; the other two-thirds are employed now and then). France is just not used to large-scale unemployment, and the slightest signs of employment recession send officials and labor leaders scurrying. Because of an unusually favorable overall employment record, the country is ill-equipped to handle an unemployment emergency, however modest. There are in France at present only 390 employment offices, most of them run down and staffed by grumpy officials. There is a gallant touch to the proposed reform of these *locaux vétustes*, which consists of the "*recrutement d'engagantes hôtesses d'accueil*" as well as competent officials.⁹ Temporary unemployment, the government tells the people, is not a sign of an individual's Darwinian deficiency, of his inability to survive with the fittest; it is rather an inescapable and necessary part of the process of modernization and growth. Old interests, ancient habits, and outmoded structures have to be remolded, or torn down all over again. The question is how to do it graciously, with dignified haste, and without compromising the aesthetics of which André Malraux has been a faithful and courageous guardian.

The little shadows on the French economic landscape are being chased by the machinery of the state with some semblance of Keynes-

sian understanding. "It is the state," de Gaulle has said, "which leads the evolution. It alone must do it because it is charged with the general interest and with the destiny of the country, which are at stake in change."¹⁰ The proposition sounds less offensive to French than to American ears. The state plans and owns; it giveth and it taketh away. It has recourse to the market whenever expedient as, for instance, in getting marginal farmers off the land and coalminers out of coal mines. It installs enthusiasm into the economy in times of sluggishness, with variable results. Thus, the government predicts an imminent upswing in business activity, while the Chambers of Commerce are less sure.

In 1967, the growth rate was the weakest since 1959—probably less than four per cent (G.N.P.) over the previous year, with industrial output growing at less than three per cent. Private investment rose two to three per cent and has shown few signs of improving in the first half of 1968. The Fifth Plan target for G.N.P. was five per cent, scaled down to 4.3 per cent in the course of the year. The budgetary deficit exceeded five billion francs, due mainly to expenditures on social security and rising public investment. For the first time since 1964, the government has budgeted for a deficit in 1968, while plugging the holes in its purse with higher social security charges, a trimming of benefits, higher rates for some services rendered by the nationalized sector, and a public loan of 1.25 billion francs.

Interestingly enough, in 1967 the French ran into the sort of problem which in recent years has beset the United States: a slowdown in economic activity (calling for reflation) and, at the same time, inflationary pressures (demanding fiscal and monetary restraint). The combination is potent enough to plunge the most ardent Keynesian into distraught reflection. The slowdown was real; the inflationary specter was just around the corner. Professor Jean Fourastié¹¹ has argued that these problems should be kept in perspective. The price push was (a) not so bad, and (b) was concentrated on goods and services that had not kept up with technical progress.

⁹ "recruitment of attractive hostesses." *L'Express*, May 29–June 4, 1967, p. 9.

¹⁰ "La Conférence de Presse du Président de Gaulle," *Le Figaro*, November 27, 1967, p. 6.

¹¹ Jean Fourastié, "Tous les Prix ne Baissent Pas," *Le Figaro*, November 13, 1967, pp. 1, 20.

Taking 1962 as 100, the retail price index in September, 1967, stood at 118, but cinema tickets went up to 160, rabbits (non-mechanized) to 118, and the *bifteck* to 142. On the other hand, chicken (mechanized) stood at 100, as did the *vin ordinaire*, gasoline, and stationery. Bread, unfortunately, was at 121, personal services at 131, and medical services at 155. But the wage index (1962–1967) rose to 138 in 1967 (September).

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM

Ignoring minor statistical problems, which may make the figures look somewhat better than they really are, the basic problem may be summed up as follows. In 1967, the cost of living went up by 2.8 per cent, not so bad when one recalls the increase in railroad fares and other public charges. The long-run growth of productivity was a little better than four per cent per annum, a good showing all in all. But, and this is the danger signal, wage rates are moving ahead at six per cent per year, which means a rise in unit costs. In 1968, given the Common Market, the French must look over their shoulders all the time, especially across the Rhine. And what they see is a decline in German unit costs in 1967. They also see relatively stable prices in Germany since 1966, and a 45 per cent drop in unemployment (May–October, 1967). Beginning in 1968, Germany has put additional levies on imports and has made extra concessions to exporters, all of which makes the French competitive position more difficult both inside and outside the Common Market. The British pound is at half mast, with possible repercussions on French exports and imports.

The rush on gold has led to an influx of sizeable amounts of dollars and other currencies into France, adding to France's money supply and making the inflationary specter somewhat more insistent. As a precautionary measure, the Bank of France raised some of its interest rates in December, 1967. French exports to countries outside the franc zone rose 2.5 per cent in 1967, while imports increased by more than 7 per cent. Although the balance of payments was in deficit vis-à-

vis Germany, the overall balance has been in gentle surplus since March, and reserves stood at just under \$7 billion.

PROGRESS

The French problem is to render the economy competitive in the larger Common Market setting. This is a formidable but not insuperable task, one which will no doubt involve a great deal of personal readjustment on the part of those destined by the laws of the Common Market to become the sacrificial victims of future prosperity. The breathing spell given to all the member countries by the Treaty of Rome has not been wasted in France. The President is not indulging in what his critics choose to call "visions of grandeur" when he passes in review the achievements of his regime—of which political stability is one, and perhaps among the more controversial. Before the slight recession, industrial production had risen on an average by 5 per cent per annum, and industrial exports had tripled. In the interests of future competitive ability, the government has encouraged industrial mergers and better methods of management.

On January 1, 1968, three Lorraine steel companies with a combined labor force of 600,000 and a total output of iron ore amounting to 20 million tons plus 7.8 million tons of steel merged into France's biggest steel combine capable—it may be presumed—to stand on equal footing with the giants of the Ruhr. In July of 1967, the automobile firms of Citroën and Berliet went through a similar merger. On the consumption front (and "front" is the right word in the fight for survival), France's two biggest mail order houses are talking hard and fast along the same lines, with a view to containing the invasion of German houses and of Sears and Roebuck which, as the General might put it, spies with hungry eyes at the French market from across the Spanish border. The Paris Bourse got its own version of a Securities and Exchange Commission, in preparation for good business to come. Credit cards have invaded the retail trade, and the rumpus is not over yet. And, horror of horrors, there

will be television commercials discreetly concentrated into two ten-minute periods every day.

Although the situation in many sectors and regions of agriculture is far from brilliant, substantial progress is being made. In the last eight years, direct budgetary aid to agriculture increased tenfold, and much of that increase was for modernization of the industry's institutional structure and methods of operation. For all its shortcomings (primarily financial) the social security system instituted by de Gaulle in 1945 has had a profound impact on the nation's health. The death rate has declined from 11.4 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1962 to 10.6 in 1966. The old wobbly franc has become a hard currency. Almost all outstanding foreign debts have been repaid, and very substantial—some say excessive—gold and foreign exchange reserves have been accumulated. Gold holdings, as much a political as an economic gadget, have jumped from \$0.7 billion in 1958 to \$5.2 billion in 1966, and this in addition to private hoards estimated at \$4.5 billion.¹² For economist Jacques Léon Rueff, gold is seemingly part of his intellectual makeup and the keystone of his monetary theory. To the General, gold, "immutable, impartial, and universal," is the language of political dialogue with the "big people."

Perhaps the most significant single achievement of de Gaulle's reign, and one which belies the frequently made charge concerning the General's political anachronism, is France's performance in the fields of research and development. Since 1958, the government's support for the training of research personnel has risen tenfold. The country has now some 40,000 researchers of excellent

quality and, in spite of much snickering abroad, has made important progress in the fields of mathematics, nuclear physics, chemistry, electronics and space science. These, according to the government, are to remain the priority sectors of future national concern.

But to acknowledge the achievement is not to overlook nagging problems which still beset the foundations of the French effort. In the simplest terms, the problems center on France's cumbersome and in many respects outdated educational system. It is not just a question of more classrooms, teachers and laboratory facilities, although that is pressing enough; it is, above all, a matter of attitude. It is often said that the old fight between clerical and lay education which bedevilled the French scene for almost a century has now been replaced by the struggle between the elite and the universal approach to education. But even that version of the trouble skips many a basic issue.

The issues are (a) the nature of the selection process (the infamous *baccalauréat* weeds out about half the candidates every year), (b) the closely related problem of the social structure of the student body and the teaching profession at the university level (children of industrial workers represent 37 per cent of the population but only 8 per cent of the student body, while children of professional and managerial parents account for 30 per cent of university students), (c) mobility of poor but able students into the *grandes écoles*, in part a question of the shortage of scholarships but more importantly, perhaps, a problem of social rigidity which perpetuates privilege and inbreeds technical and scientific mandarins and (d) the content of instruction which, for all its merits—and they are many—is still too much concerned with surface polish, and an engaging but socially costly elegance of expression and style.¹³ Only one two-hundredths of the student body at the university level is made up of the children of unskilled laborers. By the time one reaches law, economics and medicine this proportion becomes socially explosive.

France has at all times been troubled by

¹² "L'Or du General," *l'Express*, December 4-10, 1967, pp. 10-11.

¹³ "Not by Chromosomes Alone," *The Economist*, November 25, 1967, pp. 846-849. On Maurice Schumann's review of France's research and development effort, see *Le Figaro*, November 3, 1967, p. 6. In seven years the scientific research budget rose fourfold, the number of researchers 3 times. During the debate on the budget it was pointed out that the United States devotes 12 times more money than France to scientific research (3.4 per cent of G.N.P. in the U.S., 2.1 per cent in France).

problems of class and the Gaullian vision includes the elimination of this irritant. Yet, the Gaullian remedies (such as profit-sharing) hardly scratch the surface. True, the problem is deep seated and it would be unfair to expect easy or quick solutions. What is important is that the search for solutions should not be confused by rhetoric, elegant in form though it may be, but rather that it should be directed toward finding and bringing out the latent talent of the masses of the French people. There are hopeful signs that this is at last understood and that in the years to come the French will yet find that elusive combination of high quality and large numbers, professional competence and personal elegance of which this nation has given abundant proof in the past. The malaise which grips the French educational system today, like French troubles in agriculture and industry, is the symptom of dynamic change. A profound revolution is going on in this as in other segments of society. It is only to be expected that it should occasionally come to the surface in violent eruptions of impatience and frustration.

HOUSING

Housing is another problem. Here again, much has been done, but with the legacy of the past, a great deal of running merely looks like standing still. For some time, there was too much emphasis on the construction of expensive apartments, many of which could not be sold on completion. In the last ten years, the government has stepped up its intervention in the building trade with, on the whole, positive results. In 1967, 425,000 dwelling units were completed, compared to 414,000 the year before, and 411,600 in 1965. Subsidized housing covered 359,000 units in 1967 as compared with 356,000 in 1965. In 1968, the number of subsidized dwellings is to rise to 368,000, recession permitting.¹⁴ The forceful entry of the government into housing since 1964 has resulted in

a 3.5 per cent decline in interest rates and a 36 per cent fall in annual mortgage charges, something that the private building trade is not overly excited about. It is anticipated that the Common Market tax which will be imposed in 1968 will tend to raise apartment prices by 3.5 per cent and lower the return on housing investments by 35 per cent (say the optimists in the trade) or 65 per cent (according to those little given to a rosy outlook).¹⁵ The Fifth Plan foresees the construction of 480,000 apartments in 1970, 320,000 of them with state aid.¹⁶

The increasing physical mobility of French families is beyond question. Frenchmen actually travel abroad in large numbers these days, though they may not always like what they see there. They travel, many of them, in their own cars, in a manner which has become proverbial among traffic policemen. Forty-eight per cent of French families now own a car, but they use their vehicles with parsimonious restraint in terms of running time. Parisians, for example, use their cars only 11.8 per cent of the time, while New Yorkers use theirs 35 per cent.¹⁷ Seven hundred thousand cars park in Paris daily; 80,000 more speed through the streets at the same time. For the city to burst, it would need 1.3 million cars. That is precisely the number which enters and leaves the city gates every day. Traffic has changed the face of Paris and uses up almost 40 per cent of the town's annual budget. Cars need roads to run on, and there is a problem there, too. The stress is on autoroutes in the most productive regions, while relatively little attention is being given to connecting roadways. In 1968, highway taxes, the price of gasoline, and automobile insurance premiums are all scheduled to go up.

TOUCHY SUBJECTS

This survey would not be complete without a word or two on the socio-economic highlights of 1967: social security and profit-sharing, and some supplementary comments on the growing pains of agriculture. All have been mentioned in passing, but there is more to such problems than meets the eye.

¹⁴ *Le Figaro*, November 10, 1967, p. 6.

¹⁵ *Combat*, November 15, 1967, p. 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, November 10, 1967, p. 6.

¹⁷ *Le Figaro*, November 24, 1967, p. 7.

The social security problem is simple in its essentials. The nub of the difficulty is that the price of health is more than even the richest state can bear. It is widely acknowledged, at least in the Western world, that health is not a commodity like others, and that it cannot be left entirely to the calculus of the market. On the other hand, it cannot be taken out of the market completely without bankrupting the agency which does the taking. If medical treatment becomes a right, "free" of charge (paid for over the years by employer and employee, with the state chipping in to make up the deficit), the result will be a flood of demand for a service and the goods used to perform it which—somewhere along the way—are priced in the market.

It has been estimated that one open-heart surgery eats up seven years of medical insurance for a fully paid-up patient. Added to this are three to six months of hospitalization and a year's convalescence. Ten years ago, France had two hospitals that could perform such operations; now there are fifteen. Ten years ago, these two hospitals performed two operations a week; now the fifteen hospitals perform two open heart surgeries a day. The result has been an annual and growing deficit on the social security account which the state had to make good. In 1966, the deficit amounted to over 2 billion francs. Interestingly enough, the professional and managerial strata had used the service 20 per cent more than the workers, 100 per cent more than the farmers, and 120 per cent more than agricultural laborers.¹⁸

Since the service has come to be viewed as a *tuteur universel*, there have been instances of claims for the expenses of a daughter's wedding and others for slimming cures by middle-class matrons in search of the fountain of youth. The 1967 reform amounted to the following: instead of paying 6 per cent of their annual salary into the fund up to a limit of 1,140 francs, the insured will now have to pay 6.5 per cent up to that limit, and 1 per cent beyond that. Reimbursements

for medical, dental, and thermal services have been reduced by 10 per cent. There is to be stricter control over medical prescriptions.

The profit-sharing scheme covers only 5 million workers at present, not yet the 15 million forecast. The share of profits in the total wage package is not more than 4 per cent.

As for the farmers in the depressed areas, the tragedy is real and is likely to get worse. This is perhaps the one sector in which state policy had been deficient in the past, and the time lost is now being paid for in riots and discontent. What is involved is nothing short of a revolutionary transformation of agriculture from small-scale, neo-subsistence farming in many regions, to large scale, commercial farming capable of competing in the larger framework of the Common Market. In the long run, it is all to the good, but, to paraphrase Keynes, many a Minister of Agriculture is likely to be dead in the long run, and in the short run too. France is not alone in this; the United States, to take an example close to home, had been grappling with the problem for decades.

What is involved is the elimination of the marginal farmer, and in many parts of France the marginal farmer is just about as marginal as they come: 82 per cent of the farms in Brittany, for example, are between 1–20 hectares, while the government's aim is to reach a minimum farm size of 40 hectares. With his telescopic vision, de Gaulle perceives 1.5 mil-

(Continued on page 180)

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¹⁸ *L'Express*, August 14–20, 1967, pp. 11–15. See also *The Economist*, September 2, 1967, p. 816.

"To defend what is regarded as her African heritage is . . . a major policy aim of France today. If South Africa, Nigeria or the Congo can be brought into closer association with France, so much the better for France. But the defense of the former French colonies comes first." In this review of French policy toward her former colonies, this specialist points out that instead of the old concept of the French Community, "there is evolving a new type of community—a language, currency and defense system that would group together francophonic Africa, and extend to Quebec and to Southeast Asia."

Toward a Greater French Community?

By KEITH IRVINE
Specialist in African Affairs

TIMES CHANGE. Particularly in the new age of electronic communication, national status is constantly being subjected to reevaluation. France alone illustrates this fact, having in the space of a single lifetime—that of de Gaulle, for example—endured all manner of vicissitudes. It was, after all, barely 25 years ago, during the Second World War, that South African Field Marshall Jan Smuts declared that since France was no longer a great power she should join the British Commonwealth.

Today, the wheel of fate has swung round, and now it is Britain who, with her status in contest, seeks admission to a European Common Market in which France plays a leading role. With empires as with kings, scepter and crown must tumble down, but in this surprising century no one can be sure what further transformation of condition the next decade may bring.

If transformations have occurred in the status of great powers, they have also taken place in their former dependencies in Asia and Africa. It was, no doubt, French Africa that the South African Smuts had primarily in mind when he made his challenging remark. Whatever future he foresaw, it is un-

likely that he envisaged the emergence of no less than 39 independent states on the African continent¹, of which 17 are former French dependencies, and three more are of French expression. Yet despite the accession to independence of these states—13 of them in a single year, 1960—today most of them remain as closely associated with France as they ever were. It might even be said that the removal of the artificiality of the colonial relationship has strengthened rather than weakened the link between France and most of the new states. The old concept of the French Community—designed as a substitute for, if not a barrier to, outright independence—has been scrapped, but in its place there is evolving a new type of community—a language, currency and defense system that would group together francophonic Africa, and extend to Quebec and to Southeast Asia. Nor is it precluded that other territories might eventually be drawn into the association. For example, French links with South Africa are increasing. Haiti, the only French-speaking state in the Latin American complex, has ancient ties as well as ancient quarrels with France. The Quai d'Orsay, whose interest in the Nigerian region of Africa goes back to the 1890's, is now watching developments there closely for reasons best known to itself.

¹ i.e., including South Africa, but not Rhodesia.

It is, however, the French-speaking African countries that would constitute the most substantial part of the evolving community. The association between France and these African countries is facilitated by logistics no less than by language; France and her former colonies have acquired much knowledge and understanding of each other; while long-established economic links further reinforce their relationship.

Paradoxically, it would appear that some of the earliest contacts between Frenchmen and Africans may have taken place on French soil during the Saracen invasion of France in the eighth century. The historical accuracy of the specific events chronicled in the *Chanson de Roland* is, to say the least, questionable, but it is generally accepted that the *Chanson* embodies much oral tradition—tradition that has frequently proved more reliable than the written word. It is therefore not without interest that among the forces that Roland faced at Rongevaux² were “full fifty thousand” African tribesmen, “as black as ink from head to foot.” In later centuries, French ships occasionally traveled to West Africa, although French involvement in the transatlantic slave trade never reached the proportions reached by the Portuguese, Dutch or English.

Occasional overland contacts appear also to have been made with African societies. Apart from military clashes—such as some of those during the Crusades, which took Frenchmen to the Nile as well as to the North African littoral—occasional fragmentary glimpses have come down to us of sporadic pre-Colombian communication with West Africa. For example, it is recorded that a stir was created in Marseilles in 1413 when a Frenchman, Anselm d’Isalguier, arrived home from Gao on the Niger, where he had spent several years, bringing with him an African wife, an entourage which included two eunuchs and three women servants, and a dowry of gold and jewels.

² Rongevaux is in the Spanish Pyrenees. However, the Saracen forces penetrated as far as Poitiers, where they were halted and driven back by Charles Martel.

FRANCO-BRITISH RIVALRY

During the seventeenth century—when French settlements were first established in Senegal with the consent of the local chiefs—French colonial interests as a whole were served by two outstanding men, Cardinal Richelieu and Jean Baptiste Colbert. Richelieu encouraged the formation of colonizing companies, both in the New World and in the Old. Later, Colbert organized French holdings on both sides of the Atlantic into a centralized mercantile system that in its efficiency surpassed the colonial efforts of the English and the Spanish. In so doing, Colbert replaced individual companies *à l’anglaise* with a single corporation, the Company of the West, which operated as an agency of the French Crown, and which was consequently backed where necessary by the resources of the state, military and otherwise. In the eighteenth century, however, when the Anglo-French struggle was being waged on a world scale, British control of the seas overcame this earlier French advantage, so that in India and North America alike the British emerged as victors.

Yet the greatest contest was still to come. With the coming of the French Revolution, the British found everything at stake once more. When Napoleon came to power, France militant was challenging British hegemony throughout the world, not only in military but also in ideological terms. The shock of that confrontation with revolutionary France had not a little to do with Britain’s abandonment of such venerable institutions as the slave trade, and her nineteenth-century espousal of the doctrine of free trade, according to which the prosperity of one’s trading partners is preferable to their exploitation and ruin.

Napoleon made the mistake—and it cost him his chance of success in the New World—of listening to those who advised him to restore slavery to the French semi-dependency (as it then was) of San Domingo (now Haiti), which had been the richest of all French colonies. On being told that slavery had produced the best economic results before

the Revolution, he had assumed that it would therefore do so again if it were reintroduced. In the event, the opposition to slavery of the African-descended contemporaries of Toussaint Louverture and Jean Jacques Dessalines, plus disease, led to the loss of 63,000 French lives, among them 10,000 sailors who could have proved useful, if not decisive, at Trafalgar. Napoleon was accordingly obliged to renounce his San Domingan venture, and his long-range plans for the reestablishment of French power on the North American mainland³, and turned instead to other designs. To replace the lost tropical trade of San Domingo, French planners decided to capture Algeria, a country less susceptible to British blockade, being close to the French coast. Invasion plans were accordingly drawn up, but were not put into effect until after Napoleon's death when, in 1830, the first step in the long-drawn-out French occupation of North West Africa began at last.

With Britain supreme at sea, nineteenth-century French preoccupations were primarily directed to Europe. Napoleon III, however, backed the ill-starred Mexican venture, as well as the first phases of the success-

ful annexation of Indochina—a process which took place between 1861 and 1886.⁴ It was, however, after the French defeat at Sedan in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 that the Germans took to encouraging France in a policy of colonial expansion. They saw that such a course would at one stroke turn French eyes away from Europe, at the same time bringing France into eventual conflict with Britain, thus reviving—to German advantage—the ancient Anglo-French quarrel. The British had hitherto paid little attention to Africa, being largely satisfied with their way-station to India at Capetown. French interest in Africa, however, made them fear for the strategic security of the imperial economic lifeline to India and the East, which from 1869 onwards ran through the Suez Canal. A new and potentially dangerous situation thus arose, which was temporarily resolved by the conclusion in 1885 of the Berlin Act following a 14-nation conference on Africa, 1884–1885. The Act laid down the rules for the “scramble for Africa” that followed, in accordance with which the British calculated that they could safeguard their “passage to India,” at the same time gaining an opportunity to receive a large share of the spoils. During the “scramble” itself, however, confrontations in the interior of the continent—first on the Niger and later at Fashoda—raised Anglo-French tension to a peak before settlements were reached. Meanwhile, in North Africa, colonizers like Louis Lyautey⁵ were working to consolidate French power.

During the First World War, African troops came to France for the first time in over a thousand years, but this time as defenders of her soil rather than as invaders. By 1917, there were 31 African battalions on the Somme. Arrangements for their recruitment had been made by Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese politician and a friend of the French war premier, Georges Clemenceau. After the war Diagne was able, through Clemenceau, to influence the Versailles peace conference to place the captured German colonies under the League of Nations mandate system, instead of dividing them up among the victors.⁶ Al-

³ It is of interest that Toussaint Louverture rejected a French proposal that he invade Jamaica and the southern United States in order to abolish slavery there—an enterprise that would have received the support of the French fleet. Toussaint refused because he judged that by unleashing him against the mainland the French would kill two birds with one stone—getting him off the island as well as embarrassing the Anglo-Saxons—without giving him any assurance of success or advantage for himself and his compatriots. If he won, France would also win. If he lost, only he and those of African descent would lose.

⁴ The French first became involved in Indochina in 1799. Laos was absorbed by 1893, after which the Indochina Union was formed.

⁵ Paradoxically Lyautey, one of the most renowned French administrators, owed much of his success to his policy of strengthening local authorities in colonial territories—a decentralizing approach that owed much more to British than to French colonial tradition.

⁶ Diagne worked closely at this stage with American Negro scholar W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, who in 1919 organized a Pan-African Congress in Paris, and advanced the idea that educated Negroes should have some voice in the disposition of the former German colonies. Du Bois, a vocal propagandist, obtained most of the credit for the results obtained, but without his alliance with Diagne the concept would not have materialized.

though little of Africa was affected,⁷ it was enough to give the remaining colonial powers pause. The principle of international accountability for colonies had at last been established.

Meanwhile, France was striving to administer the vast expanse of Africa that had already fallen to her lot. Administratively, the North African countries of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, each of which had a different status, were treated as one type of entity, whereas the remaining territories were associated in two separate groupings—French West Africa, known as *Afrique Occidentale Française* (A.O.F.), established in 1904, and French Equatorial Africa, known as *Afrique Equatoriale Française* (A.E.F.), established in 1910. Until World War II, both A.O.F. and A.E.F. were in effect administered by a skeletal French administration that could do little more than maintain itself while providing some additional benefits for metropolitan French interests. So skeletal was the administration that, for example, in 1925 less than 50 Frenchmen lived in Fort Lamy, capital of Chad. *La corvée* (forced labor) was openly exacted in the French territories and, particularly in A.E.F.—the least advanced of the two regions, and the one in which the concessionaire system had been permitted to operate—endemic abuses led to recurrent scandals.

⁷ The former German colonies were Togo, Cameroons, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanganyika, and South West Africa.

⁸ The Third Republic lasted from 1871 to 1945. Its predecessors were the revolutionary (First) Republic of 1792 to 1799, and the Second Republic of 1848–1852.

⁹ Hitler disapproved of French attitudes towards French Africa. "If the development of France in the present style were to be continued for three hundred years [he wrote] the last remnants of Frankish blood would be submerged in the developing European-African mulatto state. An immense self-contained area of settlement from the Rhine to the Congo [would be] filled with a lower race gradually produced from continuous bastardization." *Mein Kampf* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1943), p. 644.

¹⁰ *The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 1940–1946* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), p. 323.

¹¹ The provisional government was not however recognized by the major powers—the U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—until it established itself in Paris in October, 1944.

The subject people of the French Empire, slumbering in the lap of the Third Republic,⁸ were abruptly awakened by the French surrender of 1940. The German occupation of Paris and the Japanese invasion of Indochina came as traumatic shocks to the imperial system. In French Africa the crisis took on its own character as the officials in different territories opted either for the collaborationist government of Vichy, or for General Charles de Gaulle's Free French, who had pledged to continue the war. Thanks to the initiative of Felix Eboué, the black Guyanese-born Governor of Chad, who declared for de Gaulle, the territories of A.E.F. as well as Cameroon rallied to the Cross of Lorraine, the symbol of Free France, although not before some fighting had occurred in Gabon. Consequently, de Gaulle promoted Eboué as Governor-General of A.E.F., an appointment that symbolized the coincidence of African and Free French interests as opposed to Nazi and Vichy interests.⁹ In retrospect it is not without interest that de Gaulle's vigorous intervention in Equatorial Africa had a far-reaching strategic effect. Although Hitler, preoccupied with Europe, remained largely disinterested in Africa and in Asia, many of his entourage had wider vision, and events in Africa might well have taken a different turning. As the South African Smuts told de Gaulle in 1942:

If you, de Gaulle, had not rallied Equatorial Africa, I should never have been able to hold South Africa together. Once the spirit of capitulation had triumphed at Brazzaville, the Belgian Congo would have succumbed in its turn, and from then on those elements in my country which oppose our military alliance with England would certainly have taken the upper hand and contrived a collaboration with the Axis powers. German hegemony would have been established from Algiers to the Cape.¹⁰

The Anglo-American landings in North Africa on November 8, 1942, further altered the situation. Thanks to American diplomatic preparation, fighting was minimal. Vichy and Gaullist factions wrestled for political control—a struggle which ended with the establishment of a Gaullist provisional government in Algiers in 1943.¹¹ In conse-

quence, all French Africa—North, West, and Equatorial—came once more under a unified political system. The division between Free France and Vichy was over in Africa—and eventually in France, for without Vichy's independence of action, free from German control, in Africa, where Vichy had both forces and gold reserves, it lost its leverage, and could exist only at the sufferance of Berlin. When Allied forces drove the Germans from Tunisia in May, 1943, the struggle in Africa was over.

The proclamation of the Atlantic Charter had evident consequences for colonial territories, and the French felt the need for a new approach to colonial questions. The foundations for this were laid by social and economic decisions taken at the Brazzaville Conference in January, 1944. The Brazzaville Conference, in effect, marked the recognition by the French colonial administration that a *prise de conscience*—a political awakening—had occurred in Africa.

After the war, following the establishment of the Fourth Republic, a new French constitution was proclaimed in 1946, which allowed for the representation of the colonial peoples in the central governing institutions in Paris, even though the representation was twice overweighted—first in favor of France as opposed to colonial areas, and then in favor of Europeans as opposed to Africa or other peoples. To a chosen Afro-Asian élite, therefore, France offered liberty and equality

—but only as individuals. So the French Union, as it was known, came into being.

Blows to the viability of the Union came, however, both from within and from without. From within came first the Indochina War of 1946–1954,¹² and then the North African crisis, culminating in the Algerian uprising which began in November 1, 1954. From without came news, which had an electrifying effect upon the populations of West Africa, that the British colony of the Gold Coast was to become independent within the British Commonwealth under the political leadership of an African premier, Kwame Nkrumah. The French response to the erosion of confidence in the Union that occurred as a result came in the form of the *loi-cadre* (enabling law) of June 23, 1956. This act, which laid down general principles for reform, made it possible for specific measures to be proclaimed as necessary, simply by official decree. Among other reforms universal suffrage was introduced in the overseas territories, and in each territory executive councils having a majority of elected members were established. In this way it was hoped to prevent the resurgence in black Africa of the violence that had wrecked French institutions in Southeast Asia and that was then wrecking them in North Africa.¹³

The Algerian war created a somber background for the events that followed. It led to a French political crisis which gave de Gaulle, who had staged a tactical retreat from the political arena, an opportunity first to influence and then to control events once more. Following de Gaulle's return to power in the summer of 1958, a referendum was held in September which led to the establishment of the Fifth French Republic. Under its constitution, the French Union was transformed into the French Community. The Community represented a further decentralization of power, although France still maintained control over the whole. In effect, from the African standpoint, it made much possible—but not independence. A rejection of the referendum, nevertheless, was the equivalent of an assertion of independence. One territory, Guinea, under the leadership of Sékou Touré,

¹² In Indochina the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh and his many nationalist supporters had attempted to achieve a *modus vivendi* with France, and had come near to success. The efforts made by both sides were undone, however, by the French colonial authorities in Indochina itself. Following a massacre of 6,000 people at Haiphong by the French Army in November, 1946, the Indochina War broke out on December 19, 1946.

¹³ It is notable that some French-speaking Africans criticized the *loi-cadre*—which effectively ended the A.E.F. and A.O.F. groupings as nascent states—as a measure which “balkanized” Africa. In effect it can be argued that the *loi-cadre* paved the way for the creation of a number of “mini-states” which, being divided, would thus be obliged to become clients of France. On the other hand, it can also be argued that France thus avoided the internal dissensions that have wracked Nigeria. Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, who was one of the principal architects of the *loi-cadre*, opted for “balkanization” despite heavy criticism from his peers.

voted "no," and became independent in consequence. France immediately cut off all aid and technical help, apparently in the hope of driving Guinea back within the fold. The gambit failed. Ghana, which had become independent in 1957, loaned Guinea \$28 million, and no veto was forthcoming in the Security Council when Guinea applied for and obtained United Nations membership, and gained United Nations technical assistance as a result.

The African élite in other territories watched developments with the keenest interest. When Guinea emerged independent and unscathed after her act of defiance, it was virtually a matter of months before the rest of French-speaking Africa was to ask for—and to obtain—independence in turn. Seeing the interest shown in her former colonies by other great powers, and not wishing to be placed in a position in which French intransigence seemed to stand in contrast to British liberality, France made a virtue of necessity and adjusted her policy accordingly. A degree of French control was to be exercised by means of special agreements concluded between France on the one hand and each emergent state on the other. Meanwhile, the admission to the United Nations of so many former French colonies opened the possibility that France might sway a substantial bloc of votes there in the same way that the United States, through the Organization of American States, had long been able to influence Latin American voting patterns.

By 1962 when, in accordance with the Evian agreements, Algerian independence

was proclaimed, France had surmounted the worst of her long postwar colonial crises. The economic and political divisions created by the Indochinese and Algerian wars were things of the past. A form of association had at length been created that permitted independence on terms acceptable to French economic interests and to the French electorate, while meeting the demands of African nationalist opinion. That difficulties would continue to arise was inevitable, but at least the repetition of the Indochinese or Algerian experience would be avoided. Thus France, after a long interval, made a major move in the slow-motion ideological duel with the "Anglo-Saxons" that has been taking place since the Revolution, in which each side seeks to manifest to the colonial—now the "third"—world a social and economic philosophy that will be judged superior to that proposed by the other.¹⁴

NEW HORIZONS FOR FRANCE

Since 1962, therefore, France has moved with increasing confidence. With the Algerian war ended, French prestige has risen steadily in the world at large, aided recently by the contrast provided by the association of the Anglo-Saxon image with, inter alia, the war in Vietnam, riots in United States cities, and British failure to topple the avowedly racist Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia at that moment that it declared its independence in 1965.

It has also not gone unnoticed that African leaders who remain loyal to France enjoy de Gaulle's protection—as did, for example, the late Lèon Mba, premier of Gabon, who in 1964 was overthrown by a coup d'état, and then was immediately returned to power by French paratroops, sent under the Franco-Gabonese agreement (France has since similarly sent French troops to Chad, Niger and the Central African Republic). Yet such actions do not appear to have affected too adversely France's standing among Afro-Asians any more than has the French policy of providing South Africa's pro-apartheid regime with some of the arms that it needs. In part this is because everyone knows that de Gaulle

¹⁴ In the course of this duel a fundamental difference of approach between the two has, historically, nevertheless been discernible. The French have advocated the doctrine of the equality of man—an approach which led, in the colonial era, to the policy of "assimilation," as well as to a centralized administration in what was regarded as the revolutionary capital of the world, Paris. The British approach, however, has stressed the differences between the different branches of mankind, and has therefore favored decentralization in terms of local conditions. From a critical viewpoint it can be said that the French approach has encouraged a rigid mercantilism, whereas the British approach has often fostered racial exclusivity. Essentially the French premise has been that anyone can become French, whereas the British conviction has been that being British is an innate characteristic which cannot be acquired.

is not in favor of apartheid, as both his political record and his cultural attitude prove. With South Africa he is merely taken to be carrying out his part of a bargain that he apparently calculates will be of more benefit to France than to South Africa. Francophonic African leaders have another reason for not voicing criticism. The budgets of most French-speaking African states are largely underwritten by France. For example, Dahomey, which has not had a favorable balance of trade since 1924, now requires a \$10-million French subsidy to balance her budget. Good relations are also favored by the fact that French-speaking African premiers enjoy easier access to de Gaulle than do their English-speaking counterparts to Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

There is, however, as is usual with Gaullist France, more to the South African calculation than appears at first sight. To be sure, the extra business that would otherwise go to Britain or elsewhere is now given to France. But longer-term considerations are also in evidence. South Africa is no longer a member of the British Commonwealth, and Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster has hinted that he may terminate the 1955 Simonstown agreement with Britain. Under this agreement, the British Royal Navy could use the naval base at Simonstown, while at the same time Britain and South Africa jointly undertook to defend the Cape sea routes. With de Gaulle supplying submarines and other arms to South Africa, the possibility (if no more) has arisen that France could replace Britain as the co-defender of the Cape and its sea approaches—a development that would bring

¹⁵ Uranium has also had a bearing on de Gaulle's call for a "Free Quebec." One element allegedly leading to his famous July 24, 1967, statement in Montreal was that he waited to observe Canada's reaction to a United States demand that she stiffen the terms on which she supplied France with uranium. When Ottawa acceded to the United States request, de Gaulle reportedly reacted by advocating an independent Quebec.

The possibility may also exist that the principle of separatism, now in conflict with the accepted norm of safeguarding the territorial integrity of existing states, may be viewed in a new light in the years ahead in response to pressures generated in India, Nigeria, the Congo, and other states. Anticipation of such a change could be a factor in de Gaulle's apparent sponsorship of an independent Quebec.

South Africa one step further towards association with a greater French Community.

Nuclear development, moreover, is of prime importance to France, and at this moment the uranium that this requires comes from two main sources, Canada and South Africa. Obligated to France for breaking the United Nations arms embargo, South Africa, furthermore, provides uranium upon most favorable terms, specifically at \$3.50 per pound. South African leverage as a supplier of uranium is, however, likely to diminish. Uranium deposits have now been discovered in Niger, within the franc zone. These are so extensive that the Franco-Niger combine that is to work them will be able not only to meet French needs, but may also be able to export a surplus. Other deposits have been located in Gabon and the Central African Republic. Soon after Niger uranium production begins in 1970, therefore, France will no longer be dependent upon either South Africa or Canada.¹⁵ Meanwhile, African leaders are aware that Niger is to benefit substantially from the uranium discovery—both by receiving generous revenues, and by becoming the beneficiary of industrial development that will transform the economy of a state that has hitherto been among the least developed in French-speaking Africa.

FEAR OF ANGLO-SAXONS

Much of France's diplomatic action is evidently now directed against the "Anglo-Saxons"—that is to say, against the United States and Britain. Such action is regarded, however, at least by de Gaulle himself as essentially defensive in character. For example, in 1963, after stressing that France was "the only power without exception" which had fought at the side of the United States in three wars, and that "in the event of a general war, France, with the means it has, would be at the side of the United States," he described the Atlantic Alliance as "an elemental necessity." He then went on to say, however:

But it is also understandable that France, who is industrial and agricultural, cannot and does not wish to see either the nascent economy of Europe or her own dissolved in a system of a type of At-

lantic community which would only be a new form of that famous integration.¹⁶

In other words, he does not wish to see France—or presumably the French-speaking African states—swallowed up in any form by “that famous integration”—the United States of America.

Indeed, as far as Africa is concerned, de Gaulle, like most of his fellow citizens, appears convinced that the “Anglo-Saxons” are casting covetous eyes upon what used to be “French” Africa. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s renowned meal with the Sultan of Morocco in 1943, at which Roosevelt—despite the fact that Morocco was then a French protectorate—publicly expressed sympathy with colonial aspirations for independence, and proposed that arrangements should be made after the war for United States-Moroccan economic cooperation¹⁷—has not been forgotten, any more than has United States diplomat Robert Murphy’s 1943 attempt to substitute General Henri Giraud for de Gaulle as the putative leader of postwar France. Also remembered are the aid and comfort given to North African nationalism by the United States during the Algerian War, not to speak of—in another theater—the United States 1954 refusal to sending in combat troops to prevent a French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam, among other reasons, ironically, because the United States did not then wish to become involved in a war on the Asian mainland. Many French are convinced in consequence of these and other United States actions that a basic United States aim from 1940 on has been to supplant France both in North Africa and in Southeast Asia. It is against this background that present French actions towards the “Anglo Saxons” may be viewed—actions that de Gaulle, for his part, as mentioned above, sees as defensive in character, as peculiar to a certain epoch, and as incidental to a fundamental friendship between France and the United States that has “existed for close

on 200 years as an outstanding psychological reality in keeping with the nature of the two countries.”

To defend what is regarded as her African heritage is, therefore, a major policy aim of France today. If South Africa, Nigeria or the Congo can be brought into closer association with France, so much the better for France. But the defense of the former French colonies comes first. It is in this light that one may view reports that de Gaulle, in return for French recognition of Peking, allegedly demanded of the Chinese that—apart from the Congo—they confine clandestine attempts at subversion (beyond mere propaganda campaigns) to African states speaking English or other languages, and leave the French-speaking states alone. Certainly it is true that, apart from palace revolutions, and again with the exception of the Congo, French-speaking Africa in general has shown comparative stability, as a comparison of the situations in, for example, the Sudan, Nigeria, and Southern Africa in general demonstrates. This is shown, for instance, by the fact that refugees usually enter rather than leave French-speaking African states. By the end of 1966, 56,000 refugees had entered Senegal from Portuguese Guinea, while the Central African Republic, similarly, had become a haven for large numbers of refugees from the Congo and the Sudan.

In organizing French-speaking Africa, France has moved slowly and subtly, to avoid charges of seeking to reimpose French colonial tutelage. The French Community, which came into existence in 1958, still exists as a legal concept, and in fact also maintains an office in Paris directly under de Gaulle’s own jurisdiction, acting as an influential but largely informal “Commonwealth-style” secretariat. In effect, the old concept foundered,

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¹⁶ Press conference given by General Charles de Gaulle, July 29, 1963.

¹⁷ See Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among the Warriors* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 197.

"At present, both de Gaulle and the United States are too committed to old and unfruitful policies to expect that these can be easily changed or that the old amicable relationship can be reestablished." As this historian sees the situation, the old amicable relationship "is not really essential, but it is very necessary that both nations begin to adopt policies closer to the facts of world power relationships today."

France and the United States in World Politics

By CARROLL QUIGLEY

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FOR THE LAST 28 years, since the German defeat of France in 1940, relations between France and the United States have been bedeviled by misunderstandings, clashes of personalities and disputes, until today these relations seem to lack even common courtesy. A great deal of time could be spent going over these stale debates, with their unfortunate details about the personal idiosyncracies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Charles de Gaulle, John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk. But this is unnecessary, for the differences which have arisen between these two countries in international affairs would probably have arisen even if both had been governed by the most genial persons in the world.

These differences are rooted in fundamental differences of situation and outlook in world affairs. Indeed, the positions of France and the United States have been so very different in the past century that they could hardly have been expected to look at the world and its problems in similar ways. The basic difference in their two positions is that difference which is most fundamental of all: the question of varying needs of national security.

For more than a century after 1815, the

United States had security, and had it in a way that contributed substantially to an unrealistic American view of world politics. Following the Battle of New Orleans, American security did not rest on the United States own power nearly so much as it rested on the power of the British fleet patrolling the Atlantic. And the good behavior of that fleet, in turn, rested on the United States ability to invade an undefended Canada more than on cordial British-American relations, although these were, for most of the period, very good. The sum of this situation was that for much of its national existence the United States not only had security but had it cheaply, an unrealistic situation which could hardly fail to obscure the United States vision of international realities, including its ability to evaluate in any clear and realistic way an actual threat to its security. In fact, since the end of that century of unpaid-for United States security, about 1917, some of the most fundamental domestic disputes on international affairs have revolved about the question as to whether the security of the United States was, in fact, in danger or not. Such disputes reached a high level of intensity in 1917, as they did in 1940-1941, and as they do in 1968.

In France, the question of national security has always been much clearer. For more than 200 years, from 1648 to 1866, France was secure on her eastern frontier because of the territorial disruption of Germany as a result of the Thirty Years' War. As a consequence of that security on her principal land border, France was able to challenge Britain in North America, in India, and throughout the world. During the latter portion of that period, from 1777 to 1815, France was aligned with the United States in two of its wars with Britain.

But from 1866 to 1945, France was threatened from the east by a united Germany, larger, richer and more populous than herself. Over a period of 70 years, France was attacked three times by that stronger German state, in 1870, again in 1914, and finally in 1940. Those three assaults showed that France could not defend herself alone against Germany but needed the help of Britain (backed by the United States) and of Russia on Germany's rear.

These facts are well known and their implications should be obvious. But clearly they have not been obvious to everyone, or France would not have been defeated three times. In fact, even today, well-informed historians often do not see that France was defeated by Germany in World War I, as well as in the Franco-Prussian War and World War II. This failure of understanding may be excusable in view of the fact that the French were defeated in World War I not on the field of battle but at the conference table, where the peace settlements were drawn up after the fighting had stopped. During the war of 1914-1918, the initial German assault was so violent that France was almost defeated in the opening battle, as in 1870 and in 1940. The German armies were so deeply imbedded in the body of France, occupying the richest one-third of the country for more than four years, that they were finally ejected only by the combined efforts of more than thirty countries.

It was clear to France from 1918 on that she could hardly hope to withstand an opening German assault or win in any future war

unless she had sturdy allies from the opening moments and, even then, only if severe handicaps were imposed on Germany during the preceding period of peace. Both of France's efforts along these lines were frustrated by the English-speaking countries following 1918. The United States refused to guarantee protection for France or to join the League of Nations. And the British not only refused to sign a promised guarantee treaty, or to allow France to cripple Germany by any policy of partition or of economic disability but, on the contrary, used their economic and diplomatic influence to strengthen Germany. As a result, by 1936, France was totally dependent on Britain for security against Germany and became, in foreign policy, little more than a tail on a very erratic British kite. From this emerged the defeat of 1940. Whatever the deficiencies of the French military effort, "appeasement," the political and diplomatic context underlying that effort, had clearly been "made in Britain."

A GLOBAL FOCUS

The central fact of international politics is that the world is round. Paris, and especially President Charles de Gaulle, is usually aware of this fact. Washington, on the other hand, recognizes it only rarely, partly because the United States State Department is organized by country desks and area divisions, but chiefly because the limited experience of the United States as a world power, dependent on its own decisions for its own security, gives it a tendency to become semi-hysterical over isolated local issues, like Vietnam, Suez, Berlin, Cuba, Congo or Matsu-Quemoy. Much of the failure of communication between Paris and Washington is rooted in this distinction—that Paris is more likely to see problems in terms of power blocs on a globe, while Washington is more likely to see them as isolated problems whose chief interactions are to be found in the area of prestige and world opinion rather than geographic power relations.

A second and equally significant source of misunderstanding and communication failure between the United States and France

arises from the fact that United States foreign policies are still handled in the context of President Harry S Truman's period (1947–1953) and are verbalized in terms of the period when Dulles was Secretary of State (1953–1959). Nonetheless, the conditions of the world today are quite unlike those of Truman's day, and Dulles' words—or treaties—never reflected international realities, even in his own day. De Gaulle, on the other hand, may have the intellectual, social and economic outlook of Louis XIV, but his strategy and tactics in military and political matters have always been up to date.

World War II was fought on a globe divided into quarters, with opposite pairs of quadrants allied. The Rome-Berlin Axis was allied with Japan, while between these two aggressive quadrants were the Russo-Chinese quadrant on the landmass of Asia, and, on the opposite side of the globe, the Oceanic Bloc of the English-speaking peoples and the Fighting French.

The defeat of the aggressive powers created two power-vacuums, in Central Europe and the Far East, each bordered on the west by a devastated area, in Western Europe and in China. Regardless of ideologies or ambitions, the two victorious quadrants inevitably tended to flow into the two power-vacuum quadrants. Since Japan was largely defeated by sea and air power, that is, by the Oceanic Bloc, the United States flowed into the power-vacuum in the Far East, while the Soviet Union entered there only lightly. But, since Germany was defeated so largely by land forces (especially by Russian land forces), the Soviet Union's power was deeply extended into eastern and central Europe. Inevitably, there was conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in determining the boundaries of their respective power areas in each of the power-vacuum quadrants. Since neither of the two Superpowers (then or now) was hemispherical in its power range on the globe, it was equally inevitable that other powers would rise as buffers between them. This latter fact was never recognized nor accepted by John Foster Dulles.

Unfortunately, over the past quarter cen-

tury, few persons have seen the situation in these simple terms, chiefly because an ability to grasp facts is usually confused by ideological considerations. De Gaulle, who has little interest in ideologies (at least, in present-day ideologies), has continually seen the changing patterns of world politics more clearly than many others.

In the period 1946–1953, Truman's policies sought to contain the outward movement of the massed Soviet armies by the threat of United States strategic atomic weapons until Europe and China could be built up to a strength capable of defending their own areas. For Europe he wanted prosperity, power and unity, seeking these through the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Common Market. De Gaulle and France recognized the need for Europe to be dependent on the United States in the Truman "Period of Containment," and even later, but de Gaulle, at least, looking beyond this, saw Europe's future in terms of prosperity, power, and *independence*, rather than in Truman's terms of prosperity, power, and *unity*. To this day, the chief conflict between United States and French views of Europe's role arises from two different ambitions—unity or independence—and from the fundamental problem, whether these are alternative or equivalent aims. These disputes have not been made easier by the fact that the two crucial words, "unity" and "independence," have had different meanings for different peoples.

FOUR VIEWPOINTS

In general, there have been four different points of view and aims: the American, the European, the Soviet and de Gaulle's. Of these, the first and the last have shared with the Soviet a tendency to move toward a planetary system of a dominant power with its lesser satellites. It is not easy for any of the three (the United States, the Soviet Union, or de Gaulle) to see the planetary character of the system each is seeking, and this is especially true of the Americans, since in their case the satellite role of the lesser powers in the system they seek would be a consequence of the almost unbelievable

wealth and power of the United States rather than of any conscious wish. But each of these three is very aware of the planetary and imperialistic nature of the aims of the other two. Only the fourth, "European," plan for Europe's future is neither planetary nor imperialistic, since it seeks the creation of a European Superpower by the voluntary integration of the states concerned.

To Americans, "unity" has meant the unity of West Europe with North America and "independence" has meant freedom from Soviet pressure. This has been represented on the strategic side by NATO and on the economic side by President John F. Kennedy's "Grand Design" and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. NATO originally expected that an Atlantic Community extending from Canada to Turkey would be able to mobilize sufficient manpower and resources to defend Europe against any Soviet threat with conventional weapons, using the United States strategic nuclear threat to veto any Soviet use of nuclear weapons against Europe. The trade expansion program looked forward to a mutual lowering of tariff barriers between the Common Market and North America to develop an Atlantic free-trade area.

As Arthur Schlesinger wrote, "The concept of a unified democratic Europe as part of a freely trading Atlantic community had been a basic element of Kennedy's world strategy." The whole concept underlay Kennedy's "Declaration of Interdependence" of Europe and the United States expressed at Philadelphia's Independence Hall on July 4, 1962, as "a concrete Atlantic Partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American union founded here 175 years ago." On the economic side, Kennedy told the Congress,

The two great Atlantic markets will either grow together or they will grow apart. . . . That decision will either mark the beginning of a new chapter in the alliance of free nations—or a threat to the growth of Western unity.

In this project, the entrance of Britain into the Common Market was basic, for her influence within Europe was necessary to in-

sure that the E.E.C. would not move in either of the two other directions, the European way or de Gaulle's way.

EUROPE'S VIEWPOINT

The European way was anti-German rather than anti-Soviet. It might have progressed to a unified Europe in four steps but, in fact, managed to complete only the first two: the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) in 1951 and the Common Market of the Six (E.E.C.) in 1957. The other two steps were the European Defense Community, which was vetoed by France in 1954 in protest against the Anglo-American desire to rearm Germany, and the European Political Community, which has been blocked by de Gaulle since his return to office in 1958.

The key to Europe's problem, in the eyes of the Six (but not in United States eyes) is not the Soviet Union but Germany. They see little threat to Europe from Russia as long as Russia feels secure in the West, that is to say, as long as Germany remains split, West Germany does not get nuclear weapons, and the Soviet satellites of East Europe do not adopt anti-Soviet policies. The Six share Russia's aversion to a reunited Germany which would be, as it was in 1939, a monster in central Europe, able to threaten the West, if she allied with Russia, or to threaten Russia, if she allied with the West.

The Six know, if Americans do not, that the greatest threat to the continued existence of European cultural values since 1870 has been the possibility of a solid German-Russian alliance, a threat from which Europe has been saved three times, by a narrow margin (under Bismarck, under the Weimar Republic and under Hitler), only because of the anti-Slav bigotry of successive German governments. And similarly, the Six see that the greatest threat to European peace in Europe lies in a reunification of Germany. To prevent this, the Common Market, and the E.C.S.C. before it, sought to tie West Germany to the West and, especially, to mingle Germany's economic potential for making war with that of France and Benelux, so that Germany would find it physically im-

possible to wage war on West Europe. The American view that the Common Market is anti-Soviet, born of American inspiration and rooted in the Marshall Plan, is not shared by the Europeans, who see its basis in Europe's fear of another German war and find its roots in Robert Schuman and the E.C.S.C.

But the United States is still committed to the reunification of Germany, and has formally stated this position on many occasions, especially in 1957, when German unity was given priority over any German peace treaty or "any comprehensive disarmament agreement" with Russia, and the Bonn government was accepted as "the only government qualified to speak for the German people as a whole."

Not only do the Six object to America's desire for a unified Germany, but the Benelux peoples—and many Frenchmen—are reluctant to go forward from the Common Market to a Political Community of the Six unless Britain is a member, because they are afraid to give up their political autonomy to an organization which could be dominated by Germany, or by Germany and France together, without Britain to support the freedom of the weaker members. On the other hand, many persons agree with de Gaulle that if Britain came into the E.E.C. while still retaining her special ties with the United States, and especially if she brought with her, as she has insisted on doing, the European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.) of seven countries, formed by Britain in 1957 in opposition to the E.E.C., she might be able to take over the E.E.C. sufficiently to bring it into the American-Atlantic Free Trade Area.

DE GAULLE'S VIEW

According to de Gaulle, such an Atlantic Free Trade Area would make West Europe an economic satellite of the United States, just as the American nuclear control in NATO makes West Europe a military satellite. Both these ideas have more truth in them than most Americans recognize. Long before J. K. Galbraith published *The New*

*Industrial State*¹ in 1967, de Gaulle saw that the United States economy was being dominated by a few hundred gigantic, oligopolistic if not monopolistic firms motivated by a drive for power rather than for profits and able to satisfy that drive by enormous surplus corporate profits which could be used to establish control over their economic environment by buying up competing or ancillary firms, including those in other countries. Even without an Atlantic Free Trade Area, these corporations are expanding steadily into Canada, Britain and other countries, buying up corporations and economic resources or simply pushing in as branches and subsidiaries of American firms. Already, in many countries, vital decisions are being made by American executives and not by the citizens of the countries concerned.

Today, this situation can still be controlled by these countries, but once they were members of an Atlantic Free Trade Area with the United States, their powers of defense and economic autonomy would be greatly reduced. In fact, according to de Gaulle, today Britain is already reduced economically to the level of a semi-satellite of the United States because of her own economic weakness and the precarious status of the pound sterling in the international market. There can be little doubt that the weakness of the pound, and the obsolescence of the British economic system in general, with Britain's consequent need for American support, has been used to obtain British support for United States foreign policy in places like Vietnam.

Concerned as he is about American economic imperialism, both public and private, de Gaulle is even more concerned about the American nuclear veto in the defense of Europe through NATO. So long as the Soviet Union had no strategic nuclear weapons, it was credible to expect that the United States would use its nuclear weapons against any Soviet attack on West Europe. But the Russians developed the atomic bomb in 1949, had a thermonuclear bomb in 1956, at least as soon as the United States, and had long-range rockets in 1957, before the United States. By 1967, each had enough inter-

¹ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.)

continental nuclear vehicles to destroy the other even after suffering an unexpected first strike. It did not seem credible to de Gaulle that the United States would respond to a Soviet intrusion into Europe (especially Soviet aggression of small bites at intervals) by a strategic nuclear attack on the Soviet Union at the cost of the almost total devastation of the United States itself.

Even without this extreme, de Gaulle saw that Europe's dependence on the United States for its nuclear defense and counter-response left it in a condition of permanent subordination to the United States, with American consultation, even on matters vital to its allies, often late or negligible. As an example of this, he could cite the Skybolt fiasco.

SKYBOLT

Skybolt was a projected air-to-earth missile to be developed in the United States at American expense, but to be sold to the British as needed. It was to be launched from British bombers, armed with a British nuclear warhead. The 1960 Skybolt agreement was accompanied by a separate British offer to provide a base for American Polaris submarines at Holy Loch, Scotland. In December, 1962, the Kennedy Administration suddenly cancelled the Skybolt arrangement to save \$2.5 billion in development costs, and did so without adequate consultation with the British and with little thought to the political consequences. When the damage to the domestic position of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's government became evident, Kennedy rather hurriedly offered Polaris missiles to the British instead (at Nassau in January, 1963). This hardly mitigated the shock of the cancellation, especially to British defense forces, especially since the Skybolt had been intended to retain a mission for the Royal Air Force, while Polaris would require very large new British expenditures to develop the necessary warheads and submarines in the navy instead. An American offer to provide the technical data for these warheads and submarines did not help the British budget, but it did mean discrimination for the

British over other NATO members. So France was also offered the Polaris missiles, but not the technical data. The French rejected the offer, on the grounds that the missiles would probably be obsolescent by the time they could work out the other technical data.

The Skybolt fiasco seemed to de Gaulle to prove conclusively that no country could safely entrust its military security to another country and that it was not possible to trust Britain so long as she retained her special relationship with the United States. Just before the Nassau meeting at Rambouillet in December, 1962, de Gaulle had suggested to Macmillan the establishment of a joint Anglo-French nuclear defense force. Instead, according to de Gaulle, in 48 hours, Macmillan abandoned British nuclear independence to the United States after haggling over entrance into the E.E.C. for 16 months. He said,

Britain transferred to the United States all the meager nuclear forces she possessed. She could have handed them over to Europe. Well, that's the choice she made.

Accordingly, on January 14, 1963, the General vetoed the British application for membership in E.E.C. until Britain could clearly establish her freedom from the United States, the E.F.T.A., and the British Commonwealth system of economic preference, and had revised and revived her own economy to fit into the Common Market.

To most Americans, confused by their vision of an omnipotent United States besieged by numerous insidious threats, de Gaulle's picture of the world is almost incomprehensible. But except in one respect, it is close to the realities of contemporary international politics. The one exception is de Gaulle's conviction that Europe can play a major role in the world as a group of nation-states, at a time when technological advances in transportation, communications, mass media and weapon systems make it possible and necessary for the significant units of power to be organized as continental blocs. But de Gaulle is quite correct in his view that the security of any unit must rest on itself

and cannot be left to allies. As he said in 1963,

Each nation must be responsible for its own defense and can count only on itself, in the final analysis, for the eventual arbitrament of arms.

His statement is correct if the second word is changed to "bloc," meaning a unit for the control of arms but not necessarily for the control of all common interests. Originally, de Gaulle had hoped to find economic independence in the French Empire transformed into a "French Community." This hope became impossible as the empire, and the Fourth Republic, were destroyed in the Indo-Chinese War of 1947–1954, followed by the Algerian War of 1954–1962, and the independence of the African states in 1960–1961. Many of de Gaulle's economic hopes had rested on the African contribution, including the natural gas and petroleum of the Sahara, accessible through Algeria.

The Algerian crisis, which destroyed French hopes for an economic base outside Europe, also destroyed the Fourth Republic and brought de Gaulle back to office on his own terms in 1958, after 12 years in retirement. The need to shift the economic base for French independence to the Common Market did not deter de Gaulle's ambition for an independent military and political role for France.

The French rejected Dulles' "massive retaliation" strategy, which was United States policy in the 1953–1960 period. And they did not consider that the policy of "graduated deterrence" which replaced it was fitted to the special conditions of Europe, where inadequate manpower and resources in limited space made it impossible to stop an attack by Russia's five-to-one superiority without immediate use of strategic nuclear weapons.

Instead, while the United States and the Soviet Union were still obsessed with the idea of "nuclear superiority" and were still involved in the missile race of 1956–1963, de Gaulle saw that there was no need to have more nuclear striking ability than an opponent; all that was needed was the ability to inflict unacceptable nuclear damage. In the French view, this did not require that the

French equal the American figure of about 1650 nuclear vehicles, nor even the Soviet figure of about 500 such vehicles. It required only that France should be able to drop three or four thermonuclear bombs on two or three of the largest enemy cities. This could be done, the French decided, if they had four submarines, each with 16 Polaris-type missiles. These could be operational, according to the French strategic plan of 1964, in 1970–1974, with the 1966–1974 interval filled by 62 Mirage jets, armed with plutonium bombs, and supplemented or replaced by 35 thermonuclear, medium-range missiles after 1970.

THE DULLES POLICY

The alienation of France from the United States today rests as much on the inadequacies of Dulles' policies as it does on the difficult personality of Charles de Gaulle. The Dulles policy was rigid, legalistic and potentially suicidal. The United States and the world survived it only because the Soviet Union was passing through the succession struggle that followed Stalin's death at the same time (1953–1957). Dulles rejected any possibility that nations could be neutral and shifted deterrence from Truman's reliance on economic and conventional weapons to almost exclusive reliance on total nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. "Neutrality is immoral," he said. Accordingly, with NATO, CENTO, and SEATO, he drew a line along the border of Soviet power, concerned himself not at all with the strength, prosperity or democracy of the border states on his side of this line (since, to him, it was simply a legal trip-wire which could trigger massive retaliation against the U.S.S.R.), and rejected the idea that there could be any compromise with the Russians, while he encouraged revolt in the Soviet satellites.

Most frightening to most of the world, Dulles never hesitated to pressure the Soviet bloc with threats of nuclear war. On January 16, 1956, *Life* magazine published an interview with Dulles in which he told, with relish, of three occasions on which he had forced the Communists to back down by threatening to use our nuclear arsenal; "going

to the brink," he called it. The three instances involved Red China: in July, 1953, to end the Korean War; in 1954, to force the partition of Indo-China; and in 1954-1955, to prevent a Chinese invasion of the Chinese continental islands of Matsu and Quemoy. According to Dulles, this was a legitimate way to deal with an enemy; "the ability to get to the verge without getting into war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war."

If there is any merit in brandishing weapons, especially nuclear weapons, in this bullying fashion, the threat should at least be accompanied by readiness to negotiate, but Dulles regarded negotiation as weakness.

According to Eisenhower, he insisted

that we avoid giving the people of the world the impression that we were frightened of the Soviets or that the Soviets were in the "driver's seat." Foster asked wryly why we spent \$40 billion a year or more to create deterrent and defensive power if, whenever the Soviets threatened us, our only answer would be to buy peace by compromise. "If appeasement and partial surrender are to be our attitude," Foster said, "we had better save our money."

To anyone like de Gaulle, who understands the real nature of international politics, talk like this is dangerous and irresponsible. Dulles referred to situations like Quemoy-Matsu, which were of no real strategic importance but could involve France in a war in Europe in a situation where France had not even been consulted. For in 1954, the Chinese-Soviet alliance was still intact, and an American attack on Red China would have required a Russian response, which might well have taken the form of a Soviet occupation of Europe, involving NATO and France in a totally needless war.

To avoid such a possibility, de Gaulle asked Dulles in July, 1958, to establish a global strategy on nuclear weapons policy. The request was evaded. But within two weeks, the United States risked war again by sending thousands of marines onto the beaches of Lebanon, to prevent a supposed Communist takeover of that country, and at the same time it dismissed the French warship *de Grasse* from Beirut, although France's right

to be there was just as good as that of the United States marines. Accordingly, on September 23, 1958, de Gaulle sent messages to Eisenhower, Macmillan, and Paul-Henri Spaak (Secretary-General of NATO) asking for "a tripartite organization to make joint decisions on global problems." This directorate of the United States, Britain and France—the three members of NATO with "global interests"—would "draw up and put into effect strategic plans, with special reference to "the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world." President Dwight D. Eisenhower's reply of October 20 really evaded the issue of a three-power global directorate by reiterating the United States commitment to regional, multilateral pacts in which all signers would have equal voice (like Iceland and the United States in NATO).

Eisenhower did instruct Dulles to set up a tripartite committee to discuss de Gaulle's request, but the Secretary of State named as the American member the State Department official who was personally most unacceptable to de Gaulle. Thus the project fell through, although inconclusive talks went on for years.

Over those years, especially in 1959, de Gaulle withdrew the French fleet from NATO, excluded American nuclear weapons from French soil, and detached France from the NATO air defense net. Although he fully supported the United States during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, de Gaulle refused to accept the nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963, along with Red China, and soon afterwards was busy attacking the role of the dollar in international exchanges, and United States policy in the Far East. Early in 1964, he recognized Red China and demanded the neutralization of Southeast Asia. Of the former, de Gaulle said,

No war, no peace is conceivable in Asia without China having its say. In its absence it is inconceivable that an agreement can be reached on the neutralization of the states of southeast Asia, countries for which France feels a special and cordial solicitude.

Shortly afterwards, in April, 1964, de Gaulle spoke of the peoples of those countries.

While we are helping them, the Americans are

using all their brilliant new technological inventions to exterminate in the most horrible ways thousands of these poor long-suffering Vietnamese who merely want to be left alone.

In this way the relations of the United States with its oldest ally have deteriorated. At the end of 1967, when the British, years too late, finally decided to devalue the pound, the French immediately began to attack the dollar, a futile but revealing effort. The French assault on the dollar, like de Gaulle's support of the Arabs in the Israeli-Arab war of June, 1967, indicates the growing irrationality of de Gaulle's opposition to the United States. Such opposition, however well grounded it might be in the realities of world politics, cannot be based on a European "union of nations," but must be based on the firmer foundation of a real European political union, which alone would be capable of balancing the United States to the west and the Soviet Union to the east.

These relationships are clear enough to anyone who looks at facts rather than at theories and outworn clichés. Most of them are clear to de Gaulle. The United States is the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. No one can dispute its will there and only one power in the world can injure it there—the Soviet Union (and it can do so only at the price of its own destruction). On the other hand, the Soviet Union must have security on the land mass of Eurasia but must, at the same time, be restricted to its present area of dominance. This can be achieved only if there is a strong China on its east and a strong, united Europe on its west, with Russia secured against the latter by her east European satellites so that she can put pressure on the inner frontier of China. China is so weak that the present American fear of her is irrational but, as she becomes stronger, she can be restrained only by pressure on her open, grasslands frontier. Only the Soviet Union can exert that pressure. When China obtains delivery vehicles for her nuclear bombs, these will threaten Japan and the Soviet Union long before they are any threat to the United States (at which time the American defense should be based on biologi-

cal warfare against Chinese crops, rather than on thermonuclear warfare against Chinese peoples). This common threat will probably lead to a Japanese-Soviet alignment.

THE EMERGING PATTERN

France's true position in Europe and the United States true position in the world probably cannot be faced until both de Gaulle and the neo-Dullesism of Rusk and Johnson have passed from the scene. The new world of post-1980 will not resemble our still-lingering nineteenth century patterns, and will much more resemble the age of Louis XIV (which gives de Gaulle some of his present advantage). But this will be a world in which there will be no sharp distinction between war and peace. Conflict will be endemic but not total, so that Soviet-American relations may be friendly in some areas or topics, while their submarine-killers are struggling below the oceans, in the Mediterranean or the Norway Sea. Alliances will be largely meaningless because of the speed of nuclear attack, and will be replaced by informal alignments. The Dulles system will disappear most completely in South Asia, where Pakistan (a member of both CENTO and SEATO in the Dulles system) will strengthen her alignment with China against India over Kashmir and Ladakh, thus giving rise to a Soviet-Indian alignment, with a Japanese connection. The United States frontier in the Far East will probably be withdrawn from the continent of Asia to Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In the Near East, if the United States is wise, it will base its position on the three great fighting peoples of that area, in Turkey, Israel and Ethiopia, with the Soviet intrusion there based on submarine activities and subversion among the

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Carroll Quigley, a contributing editor of *Current History*, is well-known to our readers. His recent publications include *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), and a paperback, *The World Since 1939: A History* (New York: Collier Books, 1968).

Examining de Gaulle's policy with regard to the Communist nations, this observer concludes that the General "has no program for a general European evolution; his utopia of a Europe to the Urals is mere rhetoric and his only real policy is his détente by bilateralism." Yet, as he sees the situation, "General de Gaulle is the one Western statesman with the vision and the stature to call attention to the irrelevance of the cold war and to articulate policies in the perspective of post-cold-war dimensions."

Peaceful Coexistence: Gaullist Style

By STEPHEN CLARKSON

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IF A SPECTER is haunting Europe today it is the specter of Gaullism. This is a much more ambivalent ghost than the one Karl Marx identified—one which promises much but often leaves behind little proof of its substance. The President of the Fifth French Republic has managed to arouse so much emotion, in Whitehall and Montreal, in synagogues and in mosques, that it is increasingly difficult to form a satisfactorily dispassionate assessment of the basic policies that have made his personal diplomacy not just a European but a world force to be reckoned with.

One Gaullist policy that certainly cannot be dismissed as a case of senile megalomania is France's generous and exemplary aid to her former African colonies, a program that is analyzed elsewhere in this issue. An initiative of more recent vintage, but potentially of more immediate impact on the world pattern of forces, is the second phase of Charles de Gaulle's campaign single-handedly to transform the cold war from a sterile battle of the "two colossi" to a new era of world-wide détente. An analysis of this Gallic version of

peaceful coexistence should start with a look at the theory as enunciated by the General himself so that its results can then be weighed in terms of his original claims.

One of the distinguishing features of de Gaulle's foreign policy is the highly coherent—and succinct—manner in which he declares it to the world in semiannual press conferences and public speeches. As every school-boy knows, the basic reality of General de Gaulle's world is the irreducible nation-state:

It is the States—very different one from another, each having its own soul, its own History, its own language and its own misfortunes, glories and ambitions—it is these States which are the only entities with the right to order and the authority to act.¹

In de Gaulle's view, the aberrant impact of the cold war divided the world between the "hegemonies" of the two superpowers which, by their imperial power urges, stifle the national existence of all other states, France in particular.

The world situation in which two super-States would alone hold under their obedience a camp of committed peoples—this situation, over the long run, could only paralyze and sterilize the rest of the world.²

The General's familiar campaign against the "Anglo-Saxons" is thus the first part of a program of

¹ Press conference, September 5, 1960, in André Passeron, *De Gaulle parle*, (Paris: Plon, 1962), p. 429 (my translation).

² Press conference, October 28, 1966, Speeches & Press Conferences, No. 253A, *Ambassade de France*, p. 6.

becoming ourselves once again in the fields of politics, economics, currency and defense, in other words by rejecting all organizations which, under the guise of "supra-national" or "integration" or "Atlanticism," in fact kept us under this well-known hegemony.³

Dismantling the restricting relationships of his own bloc was something de Gaulle could do on his own. Still faced in 1963 by "a bloc which is still under a tyranny and ruled by men who haven't renounced their ambition to dominate"⁴ he could only wait patiently until "the spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity will win out over tyranny, ambition and domination."⁵ But de Gaulle was confident of the power of nationalism. As soon as the "Eastern peoples begin to escape from their totalitarian ideology . . . we must re-establish fruitful relations with them, in their interest, in ours and in the interest of universal peace."⁶ The liberation of the nation-state would then bring into motion de Gaulle's troika formula to end the cold war—*détente*, *entente* and cooperation. A West European "ensemble" capable of progressing and defending itself would reestablish the continent's overall cooperation so that Europe would become what it always was, "the principal element of civilization."⁷ Nation states acting in free concert would thus bring about peace on earth, as ideology and ambition vanished in the bright light of Cartesian reason. If this were the strategy, the tactics to be used were equally simple: single-handed French efforts, first of all to break the Soviet and American nuclear monopoly.

As America and the Soviet Union failed to destroy their absolute weapons, the spell had to

³ Year-end message, December 31, 1964, in André Passeron, *De Gaulle parle, 1962-1966* (Paris: Fayard, 1966), p. 172 (my translation).

⁴ Speech at Troyes, April 28, 1963, in *ibid.*, p. 155 (my translation).

⁵ Speech at Bar-sur-Aube, in *ibid.*, p. 155 (my translation).

⁶ Speech at Mayenne, May 21, 1965, in *ibid.*, pp. 182-3 (my translation).

⁷ Speech at Versailles, June, 1965, in *ibid.*, p. 184 (my translation).

⁸ Press conference, October 28, 1966, in *ibid.*, p. 6 (my translation).

⁹ Statement, January 31, 1964, in *ibid.*, p. 167 (my translation).

¹⁰ Press conference, October 28, 1966, in *ibid.*, p. 5 (my translation).

be broken. We are doing so, insofar as we are concerned, and with our resources alone.⁸

International do-it-yourself, for de Gaulle, meant acting entirely by bilateral diplomacy. Having reestablished his independent power status, de Gaulle embarked in 1964 on a campaign to build the basis for a post-cold war alignment of forces through direct state-to-state diplomatic activity. His past four years of work towards *détente* in the cold war is the story of the successes and failures of bilateralism.

BILATERAL DIPLOMACY

The opening salvo of the new policy was the establishment of diplomatic relations on January 27, 1964, with the People's Republic of China—"a state older than History, always determined to be independent."⁹ Since China had "inevitable differences of national policies" with the Soviet Union, she was to be encouraged to continue along the national way. But the pillar of the *détente* policy was "to draw closer to the Soviet Union in all areas, in a major, though unadmitted, reassessment of the danger of the "totalitarian" colossus."¹⁰ Developing from the early months of 1965 through a series of consultations at official levels, the rapprochement was consummated by the official pomp and popular acclaim lavished on de Gaulle's eleven-day visit to the Soviet Union in June, 1966. As for the People's Democracies, the President reported in his press conference of October 28, 1966,

everyone is aware that we are in the process of renewing, deeply and positively, our relations with Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary. Today, between all these peoples and ours, the Cold War appears silly when growing and friendly cooperation is being organized.

In Gaullist theory, the cold war is "silly" and hence can be overcome by the warmth of Franco-Communist relations. Can this policy in practice provide what de Gaulle promises?

THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THE LEDGER

If we assess these bilateral relationships, we will find that this series of rapprochements

indeed corresponds to clearcut national interests of both the Communist countries and France.

For the *Soviet Union*, the advantages of a warm relationship with France are numerous. In terms of Marxist-Leninist ideology, it is elementary tactics to aggravate divisions in the imperialist camp by supporting the weaker side. Even in terms of the national interests of the Soviet superpower competing with the United States, it is basic for the Soviets to support France in her attempt to weaken NATO, contain American influence and restrict the progress of West European economic integration. That de Gaulle pursues "progressive" policies toward China, Vietnam, the Middle East and, to a large extent, the Third World is cause for still more Soviet satisfaction. Most important of all is the French position on Germany. Even if de Gaulle obstinately refuses to recognize the German Democratic Republic or to condemn West German revanchism, the Soviets recognize and appreciate de Gaulle's firm stand over Germany: rejection of the Federal Republic's territorial claims in East Europe by recognition of the Oder-Neisse line; refusal to countenance German accession to nuclear weapons through NATO. Though he rejects the Soviet solution for Central Europe, his own is too vague to cause the Soviets alarm. In addition to these policy agreements, France also provides the Soviet leadership with a sympathetic sounding-board in Europe, the more valuable because his is "a Western nation par excellence" as de Gaulle himself reminded his hosts in 1966. That this special relationship is not a mere facade can be seen from Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin's three visits to Paris within the space of a year, in particular his stopping in Paris for consultations with de Gaulle last June when the Soviet Premier was en route to the Security Council meeting on the Middle Eastern crisis.

¹¹ Commentator, "France and the Soviet Union: Dialogue Continues," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 8, August, 1966, p. 50. See also Y. Nikolayev, "Soviet-French Relations an Important Factor of World Politics," *International Affairs*, No. 12, December, 1966, pp. 10-15, "Franco-Soviet Trade Prospects are Good," *New Times*, No. 32, August 9, 1967, p. 9.

Less tangible but no less important are the symbolic benefits that de Gaulle's benign friendship confers on the Soviet Union. By his presence in Moscow as the first Western chief of state to visit the Soviet Union, de Gaulle gave a legitimacy to the Soviet system that was as appreciated as it had been long withheld. Declarations of eternal friendship are hardly the stuff from which durable foreign policies are made, but the feeling of "France-is-with-you" that de Gaulle projected contributed to that imponderable process of building greater trust between the Communist and the capitalist worlds.

In terms of hard rubles and francs, the commercial relationship that has been re-stimulated since the rapprochement is also important to the Soviet leaders. Even though the absolute volume of goods exchanged is small, the Soviets have obtained seven-year credits—the best terms any Western country has given a Communist regime—to finance such projects as Renault's contract to supply the Moskvitch works with car production machinery. Technological cooperation is valued more than the quantity of exchange as is attested by frequent references to the Soviet-French collaboration on the SECAM III color television system. The establishment of a joint Franco-Soviet Chamber of Commerce in both countries is an earnest of the determination to make a break-through in the development of Franco-Soviet trade.

If there is any doubt that the Moscow leadership considers the new Franco-Soviet relationship to be of major significance, one has only to read Soviet press commentaries on Franco-Soviet relations since de Gaulle's visit "opened up a new page" in the historic relationship.¹¹ The fact that these articles frankly point to the differences separating the two countries in their views of European and even nuclear questions is itself a testimony to the relaxed maturity of their relationship.

FRANCE AND PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES

For the People's Democracies of East Europe, the significance of the relationship with France lies more in status than in statistics. De Gaulle's message offers support for

the national integrity of the countries of East Europe.

I saw [he told the Polish people over radio and television last September] that Poland is soundly established in her ethnic unity, inside her frontiers, with her thousand-year-old faith, her everlasting hope, her own national soul.

For peoples and leaderships suffering from gnawing inferiority complexes vis-à-vis the West, the mere normalization of relations with a Western, advanced state can do much for general morale. But as Rumanian party leader Ion Gheorghe Maurer's visit to Paris in 1964 showed, independence-minded states like Rumania want more than the feeling of equality; they want trade, credits to buy advanced equipment and cultural and scientific contacts that do not threaten the internal security of the still authoritarian regimes.

French independence of the United States combined with the slower pace of West European integration offers the East European countries the possibility of developing relationships with dynamic Western Europe and even broadening their security without total dependence on the Soviet link.

On the French side, the advantages of the opening to the East are somewhat different. The Franco-Soviet relationship gives de Gaulle something that had been denied him by the Anglo-Saxons: recognition as a great power on an equal basis with the United Kingdom and even the United States. Hence the importance of the consultations on a regular basis established between Moscow and Paris on the highest level after de Gaulle's trip to the Soviet Union. Hence, too, the great fanfare that announced the "hot line," a Kremlin-Elysée teleprinter link installed at the same time.

While de Gaulle's tour through Latin America drew crowds and eventually arms sales, no one really believed that France could become the leader of the Third World single-handed. But the establishment of a "special relationship" with the U.S.S.R. could balance the Anglo-American tie. Consequent technical and scientific cooperation, dramatized in the planned launching by the Soviet Union of French satellites, could also counteract

the technological prestige of the Anglo-Saxons. Nor should one discount de Gaulle's conviction that the United States is seriously threatening world stability with its interventionist policy in Asia and Latin America, a view which makes Franco-Soviet agreement on this point a significant factor in the Third World, where these views are also strongly held. In addition, the recognition of China and the endorsement of neutralization as the only solution for Indochina rationalized the powerlessness from which de Gaulle suffers on the Asian continent and bolstered his claim to speak as a "third force" in the world.

And in East Europe, a diplomatic virgin land, there is a field of activity for the apostle of national independence that can only grow more important. Relations with the Communist countries, in short, provide de Gaulle with the most convincing confirmation of his assessment of the world situation and allow him to encourage in the East what he practices with determination in the West—a polycentrism aiming to release the historical potentialities of the nation-states.

While bilateral relations between France and the Communist states serve each party's immediate interests, further reflection warns that there are built-in obstacles that set limits to the future development of these links.

THE LIMITS TO THE RELATIONSHIP

When de Gaulle claimed, as he did in a speech in the Kremlin on June 20, 1966, that "no basic grievance" has ever divided France and Russia, the dictates of courtesy obviously were getting the better of his historical perceptions. For whatever historical period one takes—the seven decades since the *entente cordiale* between the Third Republic and St. Petersburg, or the ten years since de Gaulle's installation as President of the Fifth Republic—the graph tracing French relations with Russia and the Soviet Union has oscillated more violently than the proverbial business cycle. To present the current good relations existing between Moscow and Paris as the pro-Russian phase of an historical fluctuation is a reminder that Franco-Soviet cooperation results less from deeply-shared common in-

terests than from a coincidence of negative interests that can generally be described as a mutual fear of Germany.

And, on closer examination, it seems clear that the current Franco-Soviet liaison is for both sides a case of love on the rebound. For the Soviet Union, the renewed interest in France as a Western interlocutor dates from early 1965, when the increasing United States involvement in Vietnam put a brake on détente with the United States. For de Gaulle, by his own testimony, it was Bonn's persistent cultivation of good relations with Washington rather than Paris that precipitated the search for greener fields. It is equally clear that neither Moscow nor Paris wants to push the new relationship so far as to prejudice the restoration of the dialogue with Washington or Bonn.

Within each country, the political internal balance of forces also sets limits to a rapprochement with a member of the other camp. While de Gaulle for instance has shown a talent unique in French politics to use foreign policy to forge national unity, pro-Communist policies are much less rewarding in this regard than anti-American policies. Instead of winning votes from the Communists, de Gaulle's "progressive" policies toward the Soviet bloc have had the opposite effect of making the French Communist party politically respectable, and swinging non-Communist votes to it, especially at run-off ballots. At a time when de Gaulle enjoys only the barest of parliamentary majorities, and when he is attempting to weaken the left by branding it as Communist, he must beware of developing the Soviet relationship too far.

Once one goes beyond joint invocations of the Goddess of Peace and denunciations of American imperialism, economic realities have to be faced: France is low on the list of the U.S.S.R.'s Western trading partners (in 1965, seventh after Finland, Britain, Japan, West Germany, Canada and Italy, when trade with Eastern Europe was only 4 to 5 per cent of West Europe's overall foreign trade). Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville reported to the National Assembly that trading links with the East European countries

would have to be developed from scratch. The optimism of joint communiqués and the proliferation of joint organizations do not erase the record of previous trade agreements painfully worked out yet never achieved. As for scientific and technical cooperation, the isolationism of the French academic and scientific community set against the secrecy of the Soviet bureaucracy and compounded by the language problem will require determined efforts if collaboration is to bear fruit. It is possible that there are some non-defense fields where collaboration can yield returns to both sides, but there has been no indication so far, color television notwithstanding, that it would provide either France or the Soviet Union with a solution to their respective technology gaps.

BROADER EUROPEAN POLICY

If there are limits to the development of de Gaulle's bilateral links with Communist countries, it is fair to ask what contribution these policies can make to his promised general European "détente, entente and cooperation." To bring Europe out of the cold war, solutions must be provided for the German question, West European integratoin, East European development and general East-West tension. Alas, de Gaulle's claim to be ushering in the post-cold war era fails both in the conception of his policy and in its implementation.

Though the problem of divided Germany is also that of divided Europe, de Gaulle's call for a general settlement of the German question assumes a preliminary defusing of political and ideological tensions in Europe. Yet when confronted with the Soviets' proposal for a general European security settlement, de Gaulle returns to his old NATO stand, refusing to recognize East Germany or to make concessions on Berlin. His failure to reach agreement on Germany during his visit to the Soviet Union indicates that his policy is no less sterile than his allies' acceptance of a continuing status quo that neither integrates West Germany fully into a nuclear-equipped Western alliance nor gives security to East Europe against West German territorial

claims. It is difficult to see whether Gaullist policy—or lack of policy—can do anything but stimulate the opposite of his aim: a frustrated, more nationalist West Germany insistent on acquiring nuclear weapons. This in turn will harden the cold war by driving the People's Democracies back behind the Soviet Union's defensive apron strings.

The French President's Delphic utterances in favor of a policy that is "European" but against one that is "not European," and his contradictory stands now in favor of creating Western Europe before attempting reconciliation with the East, now in favor of the opposite—restricting Western integration so as not to exclude East Europe from an overall settlement—make it clear that de Gaulle has no continuing and constructive European policy that is anything more than a tactical response to his allies' moves. His actions are leading to a stagnation of the Common Market, an indefinite postponement of political integration of the Six, and a block on the admission of new members to the Community. If the economic and technological basis for a powerful "third force" of West Europe cannot be established, the other European powers will be forced to revert to their relationship with the United States, both commercially, technologically and militarily—strengthening the hegemony de Gaulle claims to be resisting.

If this is the trend that Gaullist bilateralism is provoking in the West, what future can be foreseen for the relationship between Eastern and Western Europe? If a more powerful, unintegrated West Germany is likely to drive the East European states back to Moscow, an unintegrated West European economy is, as Jerzy Lukaszewski argues, not going to offer them the technological-industrial pole of attraction that was beginning to attract their attention.¹² The result could be little more than the multiplication of symbolic bilateralism leaving the East European economies

still focussed on Moscow. As for the technological problems that Europe is finally facing up to, de Gaulle seems to have no conception of the regional and economic base necessary if France and Europe are to weather the *Défi Américain* successfully.

And what about the great vision of a continental Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals? As de Gaulle has described it to the Polish parliament, it would play a vital role in "maintaining peace in all parts of the world." Even were it desirable for Europe to create a new hegemony (presumably more benevolent than the Soviet or American versions because of the French presence), how this is to come about through the rejection of integration is not explained. Nor does de Gaulle bother to explain how his broad Europe would resist the old hegemonies if it included the "totalitarian" superpower within its very borders. Neither does the champion of "national" nations let us into the secret of how he would include part of the Soviet Union in his great Europe while leaving out the U.S.S.R. east of the Urals. Or is he going to return to Moscow to shout "*Vive la Russie libre—jusqu'à l'Oural*"?

How, one wonders finally, are Sino-Soviet-American tensions—by all counts the most dangerous of the cold war—to be dissolved by France's bilateral rapprochements with the Communist countries?

One cannot believe that for de Gaulle, whose every public statement is carefully rehearsed and calculated, this confusion over the means to achieve his final vision is the result of inadequate thought. The more realistic conclusion would be that if de Gaulle has no coherent middle-range policy, he has no program for a general European evolution; his utopia of a Europe to the Urals is

(Continued on page 178)

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¹² Jerzy Lukaszewski, "Western Integration and the People's Democracies," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1968, p. 381. Zbigniew Brzezinski argues in the same issue that the East European regimes would develop closer contacts with a loosely organized West Europe without, however, undergoing any pressures to change their own political situations.

Analyzing the problems facing the Common Market nations today in the light of French policy, this observer notes that "The threat of Charles de Gaulle . . . meant that the Five [other members of the Market] were to choose between a Europe led by the power of the French veto, representing a reawakened Europe of independent states, and a Europe of equal states including Britain and minus France, but possibly introducing further United States control and influence." Today, "in reality the Five tolerate the arrogance and force of de Gaulle and his diplomacy."

France and the Common Market Crisis

By PIERRE HENRI LAURENT

Assistant Professor of History, Tulane University

FOR TEN YEARS, the general orientation of French diplomacy within the Six and in matters relating to the Common Market has confused, irritated and even angered individuals and nations on both sides of the Atlantic. More often than not, crisis and discord in that organization appear to follow French action or threatened action. The year 1967 was no exception, for the present state of near inertness and certainly the pace and direction of European integration are largely, but not exclusively, based on the role of President Charles de Gaulle and the French government.

The present conflict in the Six is not solely the result of French intransigence or the difficulties associated with the British entry. The current European recession, the state of the military and political Atlantic Alliance, and even changes in European public opinion on the questions of supranational institutions¹ have contributed to the uncomfortable state of affairs within the E.E.C. (the European Economic Community). Yet very real dan-

ger emerges in the veneer of mutual suspicion and incompatibility that exists between the Five—as the Benelux nations, Italy and West Germany are called—and France herself. By the winter of 1967–1968, mostly due to Gaullist attitudes and policies, outright hostility characterized the situation within the West European regional institution.

Any historian of the Common Market realizes that its short life has been riddled with controversies that have been the norm; it has not been characterized by tranquil cooperation or easy evolution toward free Europe's first true fusion of the primary six national economies. Major issues have plagued the first decade, but generally negotiations have overcome some bitter internal battles.² In 1967, frustration over failures was mixed with the hope that arose out of two major accomplishments.

The major steps forward for the Six were the successful completion of the most far reaching tariff negotiations ever undertaken to eliminate outdated obstacles to international trade ("The Kennedy Round"), and the merging of the executive organs of the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.), Euratom and the Economic Community into a single collegiate body, the 14-member European Commission.

¹ See the study of changing public opinion by Karl Deutsch et al., *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York: C. Scribners, 1967).

² Gordon L. Weil, "The European Community: What Lies Beyond the Point of No Return?" *Review of Politics*, April, 1967. Also see *Current History*, November, 1963, December, 1964, and April, 1966.

In the extraordinary conclusion of the Geneva negotiations, the economic philosophy of the Six—that substantial reciprocal tariff cuts promote economic expansion—was accepted as probably valid in the wider context of the 50 nations involved. Although only limited success in the agricultural field resulted, the binding industrial agreements reduced tariffs by an average 35–40 per cent, whereas the “Dillon Round” by contrast had reduced tariffs by only 7–11 per cent.³ There was political significance in the fact that the West Europeans spoke with one voice on the world trading scene, talking as an equal to the United States. For the first time in history, Europe’s Six, the world’s largest importer and second largest exporter, demonstrated its strong bargaining power among the world giants.

Unfortunately this achievement appeared to be threatened by the proposals in Washington in late 1967, suggesting legislation curtailing certain imports. These possible restrictions, totaling between \$6 and \$12 billion, brought up the question of potential retaliation by certain trading partners. The frightening prospect of unreconstructed protectionism in the United States, demanding measures to safeguard so-called national interests, suggested to many observers a larger international economic rivalry which would make the “chicken war” of the early 1960’s seem a mere prelude.

The merger of the three Community Executives into one administrative group, agreed upon in Rome, was another triumph of the Six, which might provide a necessary, fresh political *élan*. Yet merger of the three Communities *themselves* still must be accomplished, and the floundering condition of two of the sister organizations will require much concentrated work. The E.C.S.C. is suffering from technological change that has seen

plastics, petroleum products, nuclear energy and newer metals make coal and steel less basic resources than they used to be. Also, the E.C.S.C. does not have the power to react to surplus steel production and to cut that production. The decline of the coal industry is forcing even members of the Six to rely on national measures of marketing and support. Second, Euratom seems on the verge of collapse, for its future is endangered if its inspection system is superseded or if a Soviet-American treaty halts the spread of nuclear weapons. Even the concept of a single joint European reactor and research program is breaking down as national programs emerge and bilateral cooperation begins.⁴

A DISMAL 1967

Future historians of the Six will no doubt emphasize these two milestones of development in 1967, but they will not fail to point out the sorry state of that economic union, which can be portrayed as apathy, slowdown, general malaise and failure. Other factors, mostly not related to French action, have added to the current dismal record within the Common Market. Above all, the substantial drop in the growth rate in the Six and the fully developed West European recession diminished any powerful push for closer economic integration. This “economic pause” in expansion in 1967 marked the first time since 1958 that the rise of industrial production in Europe had been interrupted for longer than a single quarter at a time. The widely distributed slackening of aggregate demand, consumer caution and industrial slowdown ended in the worst performance year in E.E.C. history in terms of growth. An estimated 2.5 per cent expansion rate was aided only by the slight recovery at the end of 1967, and of all the members only Italy enjoyed a vigorously expanding economy, with high factory output, stable wages and a dynamic 6 per cent growth rate.⁵

Other differences in the Six in 1967 over the Greek incident, the Arab-Israeli war, and NATO reform have also illustrated the disarray of that group, but the reorientation and slackened pace of economic union or

³ *European Community*, No. 103, June, 1967. The “Dillon Round,” an earlier attempt at tariff reduction, was named after Douglas Dillon, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 1963–1965.

⁴ *The New York Times*, December 25, 1967; *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 27, 1967.

⁵ “The Economic Pause in Western Europe,” *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, October, 1967.

political unity have been caused mostly by Gaullist ideas and diplomacy, and their growing popularity in Europe.⁶

The resurgent nationalism of West Europe fits well with the French President's vision of the future, for it faces the prime question that for Gaullists is the central issue. To build a political community with an active role in the outside world, de Gaulle advocates a confederal scheme of European political unity. He is unyielding in his hostility to supranationalist notions, but he actively encourages the economic integration movement. The relentless, stubborn, yet consistent and purposeful Gaullist attempt in Europe is the construction of an independent body of states based on the existing sovereign nation-states without any federal center. As de Gaulle sees it, the federalist alternative means an American Europe, that is, a "mini-power" subservient to the now famous "Anglo-Saxons." United States presence and influence in Europe, whether military or economic, serves only American political aims, according to de Gaulle, and the federators or "Eurocrats" are merely Europeans acting for the United States. To protect Europe from this tragedy, de Gaulle has revived French power and has worked to preserve French independence and freedom of action. France will lead the Europeans into the status of a major world power.⁷

The Gaullist policy, which appears idiotic, puzzling or even sinister, is simply an ambitious desire for French hegemony in a revitalized Europe in an effort to make all European states independent of the United

States or of any power aiming to absorb Europe. Much goes unexplained in French foreign policy in the Fifth Republic, but one fact stands out clearly. The General has ambitions for France (most probably less than for himself), and many of these desires are beyond his nation's resources.

The negative aspects of de Gaulle's European policy, even his old-fashioned power politics, should not make him the enemy of European unity. He has stressed the need for and has voted for genuine economic integration and staunchly opposed free trade as inadequate and wrong. The exclusion of diverse elements in the Community often grows out of his attempt to induce the Six to look more to each other (and particularly to France) and less to the United States. He insists that European unity is not truly strengthened by United States hegemony, and the recent popular work of J. Servan-Schreiber (although anti-Gaullist in parts) is further evidence of the widespread thinking in Europe about the dominant United States role in that region.⁸ De Gaulle says Europe is relaxing in its golden chains and is leaving its political, military and economic management to the United States. The Americans are Europe's supranational government, in the Gaullist analysis, and even in attacks on the uneven distribution of power in NATO, the portrait by the French leader is "the one giant and the fourteen dwarfs."

The new assertiveness of Europe toward the United States is a realization from within that West Europe is now a strong economic rival, with ambitions of its own and the power to drive hard bargains if necessary. De Gaulle takes advantage of this mounting sensitivity of Europeans, whose own lives furnish illustrations of undue American interference. This resentment, especially strong in the Six, is increasing as American firms invade and establish plants or buy into local industry. Charles de Gaulle has been able to take this situation and the resulting attitudes of Europeans and give them greater substance and direction. Given Europe's prosperity and new self-confidence, the Gaullist offer of a "European Europe" is an alternative that the

⁶ On Greece, see Ian D. Davidson and Gordon L. Weil, "Full of Sound and Fury," *Agenor* (Bruges and Brussels), No. 3, 1967; on the six-day war, see *Le Monde* (Paris), June 17, 1967; and on the NATO debate see *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 2 and 16, 1967.

⁷ The best recent statements of the Gaullist point of view are David P. Calleo, *Europe's Future* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), Ronald Steel, *The End of Alliance* (New York: Viking, 1965), and *Pax Americana* (New York: Viking, 1967), and W. W. Kulski, *De Gaulle and The World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966). See also the near classic Gaullist points of Maurice Duverger in *Interplay* (New York), October, 1967.

⁸ Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *Le Défi Américain* (Paris: Denoël, 1967).

United States must realize as a distinct possibility in international politics.

The new kind of European loyalty that has arisen therefore makes Gaullism far stronger than de Gaulle (as many Gaullologists have correctly declared), and it is evident that de Gaulle has become a European nationalist by necessity.

Gaullist policy in the realm of economic diplomacy particularly attracts Europeans. In the Common Market, de Gaulle has found an instrument with which he hopes to build a powerful Europe, in which, most acknowledge, France will have the dominant role. In the recent discord among the Six, even de Gaulle's passionate negativism has suggested a route that many Europeans feel is unclouded, unbending, virtually unchallenged and therefore worthwhile.

PROBLEM OF BRITISH ENTRY

The struggle over the British application for membership in the Common Market was essentially based on a misconception within the Five that a new tide in 1967 would favor and support British entry. Although the ambiguities of British participation were (and are) a reality to many, both in England and on the Continent, the Labour government reapplied for membership via Article 237 in May, 1967. The French response to this request was nearly identical to its response in 1962–1963, and it never altered from de Gaulle's initial comments in May ("the slightly veiled veto"), through the end-of-the-year Couve de Murville statement at the Brussels Council of Ministers meeting.

Britain, in French eyes, was still unfit and unable to assume the duties and responsibilities of membership, for she was a Trojan horse housing "Anglo-Saxon" domination of Europe. Furthermore, to France, enlarging the Community would threaten the cohesion and solidarity of that group. Publicly, the French emphasized Britain's economic unreadiness and nonadaptability, which most Market members could see but which they

felt could be and should be adjusted by negotiations. The official French statements did not mention—but were obviously related to—France's anti-American bias which saw Britain as the United States satellite and the challenge to French influence on the continent, especially with regard to the economically strong but politically weak West Germany.

Since Britain's policy was to maintain her pound resolutely, France insisted there were conditions the British had to meet before any negotiations. The major prerequisite was devaluation, which Britain announced in November, 1967, aiming both for access into the Market and improved competition of her goods in world markets. But devaluation was to de Gaulle only a step in the right direction and far from enough. The truth was that the act of devaluation was irrelevant to France, although it fitted in with his campaign to demote the pound and the dollar. The British decision not only revealed the sad economic state of that nation but, to de Gaulle, offered an opportunity to attack American power and the dollar. Without relenting or showing any tolerance, de Gaulle announced that he hoped to see reform in the world money system, i.e., replacing the current ruling influence (the dollar) with "the universality, immutability and impartiality" of gold.⁹ The November, 1967, Elysée statement, revealing a thoroughly antiquated attachment to gold, was more than an eighteenth century French economic mercantilist idea; it reflected the President's belief that the United States penetration of European industry was aided by its privileged dollar position.

In his veto message, de Gaulle gained support from many Europeans by pointing out the veracity of the claim of opponents of the Market in Britain, i.e., that the British application was only an alibi for equipping Britain to compete in and for world markets. Furthermore, in his "*non*" he inferred that British sincerity in applying was a paradox when one considered the previous history of anti-Common Market British actions.¹⁰

De Gaulle adamantly showed his singleness

⁹ *The New York Times*, November 29, 1967.

¹⁰ *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 16 and 21, 1967.

of purpose on the British candidacy by his complete disregard for the views of his partners. In the Gaullist fashion of diplomacy by press conference, he pontificated to the Five that Britain was looking for new props to lean on. He was reluctant to concede the slightest ground on the issue of full membership, or for that matter to allow any negotiations until "the great English people act to make themselves one of the pillars of a European Europe."¹¹

The sole relationship for the British in the near future had been suggested before, but de Gaulle noted, in a carrot-stick manner, that associate membership might be a worthwhile interim measure. Most Labourites and pro-Marketeers in Britain regarded this as "bigamy" and "second class status." This Gaullist offer of association, cooperation or any close arrangement might eventually lead to membership; meanwhile it would strengthen the French concept of Europe without admitting Britain to any political or financial influence on the Continent. Although devaluation symbolized to de Gaulle the start of a transformation in British thought, France was prepared to wait and see whether Britain achieved a surplus position on her payments first. If she put her reserves in gold, she might have a chance; otherwise Britain would continue to cast her own veto.

The winter of 1967-1968 saw the Five toying with de Gaulle's Machiavellian gamble of associate status for Britain, or attempting to convince British Prime Minister Harold Wilson that other compromises might be worked out. A link (based on Article 238) of the Five or Six and the Seven of the E.F.T.A., beginning with a customs union and aiming at later confederation, was one winter alternative to immediate enlargement. In the hurried talks in London and Brussels, Wilson implacably held out for all or nothing. Although the Five thought association was feasible, such a compromise appears to have been turned down by London.¹²

BRITAIN'S FUTURE PATH

Beyond the merger of the Community and the Free Trade Seven, there were other choices. There was the much discussed possibility that Britain would turn completely from Continental Europe, and form a North Atlantic Free Trade Area. The Five, however, posed powerful arguments against Britain's complete withdrawal from Europe and generally advocated keeping the British application on the table, while working on probationary membership or association. Yet they also saw the necessity of persuading the British to make further efforts to set their house in order as a step to gain French approbation. All the Five spoke of the need for adjustment in British social and economic policies, taxes and agriculture.

The basic British refusal to accept any half-way house became a direct challenge to the Five to desert France. It may be true that a second rebuff by France had been planned to ensure the success of a third negotiation on British entry later, but it appears unrealistic to believe that France under de Gaulle will accept a full European union of equals, with no single country claiming the right to permanent leadership. More likely, many of the Five believe the French preconditions on British entry (which might take years to resolve) nevertheless offer an acceptable avenue to eventual success. The basic Gaullist directive has been accepted by the Five; they have urged Britain to put her balance of payments in equilibrium, terminate her sterling's international role, and generally restore her economy. Their strategy is not limited to this approach, however, for it persists in a search for some *modus vivendi*, which might motivate an Anglo-French rapprochement.

Outwardly, it looks as if Britain were demanding a showdown between France and the Five, but this may not be as it appears on the surface. The fact that Britain is not in a position of strength at the present suggests strongly a prolonged waiting game, mixed with unilateral British reorganization. Since Britain will not achieve a payment surplus until late 1969, membership now would mean instant catastrophe to the tune of \$1.5

¹¹ *The New York Times*, November 30, 1967.

¹² *The Times* (London), December 22, 1967; *Manchester Guardian*, December 24, 1967; *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 27, 1967.

billion a year. Adjustments made over a period of time would reduce the cost. Therefore, although Britain applies now and seemingly demands a "yes" or "no," she may actually accept a transition period. The now insurmountable French position could be scaled in some seven years when Britain could more than meet the bill, yet this again assumes a certain approval of the Gaullist path to eventual inclusion in the Common Market.

The threat of Charles de Gaulle (and threats are an integral part of the Gaullist diplomatic arsenal) meant that the Five were to choose between a Europe led by the power of the French veto, representing a reawakened Europe of independent states, and a Europe of equal states including Britain and minus France, but possibly introducing further United States control and influence. The predicament of the Five, faced with added friction and disruption within the Community, was serious, but it did not by late 1967 lead to any serious challenge to France. No country in the Market could afford to see it break up and yet all realized that some forward momentum had to be maintained. The best hope for the Five was to play the game France's way—for the time being.

Some fear permeated the almost unqualified enthusiasm of the federalist Beneluxers, and the new West German government faced the dilemma by reiterating its faith in the future and advocating temporary steps to avoid direct clashes. While West Germany plays reluctant arbiter—anxious to offend neither side—and the Benelux leaders threaten to boycott ministerial meetings of the Six, in reality the Five tolerate the arrogance and force of de Gaulle and his diplomacy.

The Five have systematically avoided any "hour of truth" within the Market. Straightforward defiance of France has been rejected, and therefore the pattern of the future will be one of watchful waiting. The Five hope to reinforce still further the gathering unanimity outside France that Europe must open its door to Britain (and perhaps the Republic of Ireland and Scandinavia) for its own sake.

But the plain truth is that under the Rome Treaty a unanimous vote of the members is required to enable any new member to join; therefore the ultimate task is to convince de Gaulle. The tactics of the Five, however, emphasize either mutual concessions, or the "radical transformation" in Britain that de Gaulle has requested, or the passage of time and, with time, the passing of de Gaulle himself. While not working to that end, the Five hope for a reshuffling of party alliances in France which might lead to an opposition capable of taking power and holding on to it. This wish demonstrates the retreat from the basic problem, for it is rather illogical to believe that *après de Gaulle* Gaullist foreign policy concepts and their attractiveness to some Europeans will disappear. Meanwhile, the reins of Gaullist rule are as firmly in his hands as ever.

If the Five have their way, they will convince Britain that head-on rows must be avoided in the present conflict in the Six. Their solution for Britain will be a further painstaking attempt to wait out de Gaulle or to test his sincerity about the voteless associate membership, certainly worthwhile on purely economic grounds. The contention of the Five will be that it seems plain a wedding cannot take place as long as de Gaulle stays in power, but that Britain is free to consider alternatives.

Meanwhile, the dialogue within the Six has stalled almost completely. Time has become a luxury the Communities cannot afford.

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Pierre-Henri-Laurent is a European diplomatic historian whose research articles have appeared in *The Journal of World History*, *The Historical Journal* (Cambridge), *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* and other journals. In 1962, he was a recipient of a Belgian-American Educational Foundation Fellowship. In 1967, he held a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Research Fellowship in the Humanities. His study of the historical origins of the E.E.C., *The Diplomacy of the Relance Européenne*, will be published shortly.

BOOK REVIEWS

STUDIES OF FRANCE

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. THE MAGHRIB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS. BY JACQUES BERQUE. Translated by Jean Stewart. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 422 pages and index, \$12.50.)

Jacques Berque is probably the most knowledgeable and certainly the most original French writer on the problems of colonization in Arab lands. Having dealt with the Eastern Mediterranean in an earlier book, he has now, no less brilliantly, covered the Arab West between the wars.

Here is a work not orthodox but lively, not detached but familiar, not cool but passionate, not academic but informed and alive, not dispassionate but committed—living and inviting the reader to live the ardors and sufferings, victories and frustrations of that strange burning earth that we still think of as French North Africa. The approach is less analytic than synthetic, attempting to grasp and depict elusive reality through its humblest parts: the men, women, objects and daily experiences that constitute it. Symbols, traditions, food and sex are all included. Professor Berque has lived his theme. He lives it still. Here is no stuffy history. Colonist and colonized, exploiter and exploited (with those they exploit in their turn), farmers and administrators, traders, laborers and financiers—the motley of North Africa comes to life in the shape of myriad beings and situations that are the warp and woof of history: not the predestined evolution of hindsight but the freedom of men and women who do not know which alternative the future will select.

No student of the Arabs or of France, of imperialism or humankind, should miss this book.

Eugen Weber
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AFFLUENCE AND THE FRENCH WORKER IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. BY RICHARD F. HAMILTON. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 323 pages, appendices and index, \$8.50.)

Professor Hamilton, a sociologist, has applied the techniques of his field to the accepted commonplaces of historical interpretation concerning France of the 1950's. Some of the results confirm established opinions, some contradict or modify them; all throw a new and useful light on otherwise familiar situations. Packed with suggestive information, his chapters unfold the relationship between the economic and social conditions of the workers and their political stance. The relations among skill, income, age, religion, schooling, sex, standard and place of living, security and insecurity in life and job, political attitudes and voting behavior, are analyzed and critically discussed. Clear and illuminating, this "study of the social bases of French working class politics" may be recommended to students of modern France and of other industrial societies.

E.W.

MAXIME WEYGAND AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN MODERN FRANCE. BY PHILIP BANKWITZ. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 445 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

Unusually, this study of civil-military relations in France of the last half-century fully carries out the promise of its title and subtitle. Around the strong, astringent personality of its hero, who played an important part in the victory of 1918 and a crucial one in the defeat of 1940, the complex and disheartening story of army politics between the wars is clearly set out. Attention is concentrated on the 1930's. Detailed chapters show how the struggle between strong personality and weak gov-

ernment, between principle and compromise, between an old-fashioned view of military needs and an incoherent, fluctuating view of political necessities led to mutual distrust, internal disharmony and, finally, military defeat. Linked to the major theme of an army which was evolving from servant to would-be savior of the state, and connected with the major political crises of the Republic and the public career of Weygand himself, this makes a dense, distinguished book, packed with information, closely argued, fascinating to follow.

In a difficult subject, Professor Bankwitz never fails to present all sides of the issues and attitudes he treats, sketching in the background but never forgetting that he deals with human beings, conditioned by experience and events, affected by feelings as well as reasoning. His is an important book, and a human one. Students of France between the wars, of her defeat in 1940, of her convulsions in 1958, will be in his debt for a long time.

E.W.

FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics. BY KARL DEUTSCH, LEWIS EDINGER, ROY MACRIDIS and RICHARD MERRITT. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. 324 pages, \$6.95.)

In the summer of 1964, 147 French and 173 German personalities considered to belong to their countries' decision-making elite were interviewed by a group of American social scientists who questioned them on matters of domestic and foreign policy, and particularly on European integration and arms control. The results are presented and analyzed in this book, which provides a useful indicator of opinion in the two countries and a fascinating profile of the national character of each. Some of the data may seem commonplace or outdated by events. We are not surprised to hear that European integration has been

losing momentum since the late 1950's, that the French are indifferent to issues of arms control or sceptical about American intentions, that France and Germany continue to view each other with only mitigated suspicion. But the data is useful and future generations of historians will find such studies mines of information not easily available elsewhere.

E.W.

THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. BY FRANÇOIS FEJTÖ. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967. 225 pages and index, \$10.00.)

This volume, by the well-known Hungarian writer who has lived in France since the late 1930's, is invaluable for the specialized student of modern French history and of modern communism in general. François Fejtö has expert knowledge of the field often referred to as "Kremlinology" and is the author of a well-documented account of the Sino-Soviet dispute, *Chine-U.R.S.S., la fin d'une hégémonie*. He examines the history of the French Communist party from the death of Stalin to 1966. His treatment is extremely detailed and is based heavily on a study of the French Communist press, as well as on party speeches and resolutions. In addition, his superb knowledge of the field seems to be based on well-informed and accurate private sources.

The crisis which the author analyzes deals with the important topic of the de-Stalinization of the French Communist party. He shows that Maurice Thorez and other French leaders were slow in adapting to the new realities of a world without Stalin. He compares developments in France with those elsewhere, especially in Czechoslovakia and Italy.

He stresses the relatively nationalist stance of the French Communists on a number of issues. While declaring themselves the champions of proletarian inter-

nationalism, they also appeal to French chauvinism—anti-German after 1941, anti-American after 1947. American readers will find it interesting that the party was both late and weak in denouncing the war in Algeria. Fejtő also claims that to the present, the party does not openly attack President de Gaulle.

The successors of Maurice Thorez have made their peace with Moscow leadership, and Fejtő does not think that the pro-Chinese tendency of some French intellectuals presents a real danger to the party. He concludes with the basic theme of his interpretation, namely that French Communists are a "national minority" with a good deal of autonomy, which gives French communism its peculiarly French character.

It is regrettable that in a detailed treatise addressed to a scholarly audience, there is no bibliography.

Sabine Jessner
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FRANCE AND THE DREYFUS AFFAIR.

BY DOUGLAS JOHNSON. (New York: Walker & Company, 1967. 242 pages, illustrations and index, \$5.95.)

The first reaction of the reader to this title is likely to be dismay at yet another treatment of the Dreyfus Affair. The author, a British historian at the University of Birmingham, anticipates this by saying that "this was an episode which meant different things to different people." Furthermore, he emphasizes that an episode so full of drama and mystery, dealing with a classic tale of injustice, can be retold. Also, as his title indicates, he is much concerned with putting the Dreyfus Affair in the broader context of French history, and his book tells us something about French society around 1900.

Johnson's book is of interest to the general reader and most useful to an American student of history. He incorporates many recent sources, most of them in French and thus not easily available to an English-

speaking public. Having done extensive work in archives, he uses new and unpublished sources. For example, he includes information contained in the manuscript of the recollections of Mathieu Dreyfus which has been at the Bibliothèque Nationale only since 1961 and only parts of which have been published in French.

While Johnson has given us a useful, concise and well-written account of the famous case, his concern to depict it as a "muddle" and his consistent debunking of the supporters of Dreyfus might tend to misinform those readers not sufficiently familiar with the literature. In the beginning of the book, the author states the three aims of the historian: to tell a story, to explain past happenings and to recapture some of the feeling and the atmosphere of the past. Johnson tells his story and explains many aspects of it. But in this crisp, English treatment, something of the moral fervor of what Georges Sorel called the Dreyfus Revolution becomes lost. S.J.

AN EXPLANATION OF DE GAULLE.

BY ROBERT ARON. Translated by M. SINCLAIR. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 202 pages, \$4.95.)

The author of this brief but rewarding book finds beneath de Gaulle's nationalism a desire to repudiate the legacy of nationalistic rivalry abroad and stultifying overcentralization within, which Bismarck and Cavour left to the European democracies. In France, his original hope was to "save democracy" by strengthening the executive power and instituting a second chamber to represent professional and economic interest groups. This was to prepare the ground on the international level for the parallel reconsideration of the idea of a European federation of decentralized "fatherlands" bypassed 100 years ago. Ultimately, the unsuccessful mission of this "seventeenth century man" was to pioneer "a new civilization" involving "the reunion of all peoples of ancient Christian civilization,

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

De Gaulle's Sixteenth Press Conference

On November 27, 1967, French President Charles de Gaulle held his sixteenth press conference. Excerpts from his remarks on Israel and the Middle East, a free Quebec and British entry into the Common Market follow:

MIDDLE EAST

The establishment between the two world wars—for it is necessary to go back that far—the establishment of a Zionist home in Palestine and then, after World War II, the establishment of a State of Israel raised at the time a certain number of apprehensions. One could wonder, indeed, and people did wonder, even among many Jews, if the implantation of this community on lands that had been acquired in more or less justifiable conditions, and in the middle of Arab peoples who were thoroughly hostile to it, was not going to produce constant and interminable friction and conflicts. Some even feared that the Jews—up to then scattered, but who had remained what they had been down through the ages, that is, an elite people, sure of itself and dominating—once they gathered on the site of their former grandeur, might come to change into a fervent and conquering ambition the very touching hopes that they had for 19 centuries.

However, despite the tide, sometimes mounting, sometimes receding, of ill will that they provoked, that they caused more exactly in certain countries and at certain times, a considerable capital of interest and even of sympathy had formed in their favor especially . . . in Christendom. . . .

That is why, independent of the vast assistance in money, influence and propaganda that the Israelis received from Jewish circles in America and Europe, many countries, among them France, saw with satisfaction the establishment of their state on the territory that had been recognized them by the powers, while hoping that they succeed, by using a little modesty, in finding a peaceful *modus vivendi* with their neighbors.

It must be said that these psychological factors have changed somewhat since 1956; as a result of the French-British Suez expedition, we saw in fact appear a State of Israel, warrior and determined to enlarge itself. Then, the campaign it conducted to double its population through the immigration of new elements led one to think that the territory it had acquired would not be sufficient for long and that, to enlarge it, it would be led to use

any occasion that would present itself. That is why, moreover, the Fifth Republic freed itself, vis-à-vis Israel, of the special and very close ties that the preceding regime had established with that state, and the Fifth Republic applied itself, on the contrary, to favoring détente in the Middle East.

Of course, we did not let the Arabs ignore that, for us, the State of Israel was a *fait accompli* and that we would not allow it to be destroyed.

On May 22 the Aqaba affair, unfortunately created by Egypt, was to offer a pretext to those who dreamed of fighting. In order to avoid hostilities, France had, as early as May 24, proposed to the three other great powers to forbid, jointly, each of the two parties from starting to fight.

We know that France's voice was not heard. After attacking, in six days of combat, Israel took possession of the objectives it wanted to acquire. Now, it is setting up, on the territories it has taken, the occupation that cannot take place without oppression, repression, deportation and there is springing up against it a resistance which in its turn it qualifies as terrorism. It is true that the two belligerents are observing, for the time being, in a more or less precarious and irregular manner, the cease-fire prescribed by the United Nations. . . .

For a settlement to be implemented, it would be necessary that there be the agreement of the great powers which would *ipso facto* entail that of the United Nations, if such an agreement came into being, France is in advance prepared to lend on the spot her political, economic and military assistance, so that this agreement be effectively applied. But one cannot see how any agreement could come into being—not fictitiously on the basis of some hollow formula, but effectively for a common action—so long as one of the greatest of the four will not have disengaged itself from the hateful war it is conducting elsewhere.

CANADA

It is the French who, over two and a half centuries ago, up until 1763, had discovered, populated and administered Canada. When, 204 years

ago, the royal government, which had suffered serious setbacks on the continent and which, because of this, could not maintain the war in America against England, felt it must leave, 60,000 Frenchmen had settled in the St. Lawrence basin. Subsequently, their community received only minimal new elements from Metropolitan France. . . .

Well, by what one can call a miracle of vitality, energy and loyalty, the fact is that a French nation, a piece of our people, is appearing today in Canada and wishing to be recognized and treated as such.

All this makes the movement of emancipation perfectly understandable and also shows that nothing is more natural than the impetus that at the same time makes it turn toward France.

. . . it is obvious that this rediscovery of one another by France and French Canada had to be solemnly recognized and celebrated on the spot. That is why Mr. Daniel Johnson asked me to go and visit Quebec, and that is why I went last July.

In Montreal, the second French city in the world, the wave of liberating passion was such that France had, through me, the sacred duty to respond to it unequivocally and solemnly. That is what I did, by stating that the motherland does not forget her children in Canada, that she loves them, that she intends to support them in their effort of emancipation and of progress and that, in return, she expects them to help her in the world today and tomorrow. And then I summed up everything by exclaiming "Long live free Quebec!" which brought the flame of resolution to its height.

That Quebec be free is indeed what is at issue.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

Ever since there have been men and ever since there have been states, any great international project has been imbued with seductive myths. That is quite natural, because at the origin of the action there is always inspiration, and that was true for the unity of Europe. Ah, how fine and how good it would be should Europe be able to become a fraternal and organized entity in which each people would find its prosperity and its security. This also holds true for the world. How marvelous it would be to see disappear all the differences of race, language, ideology and wealth, all the rivalries, all the frontiers that have always divided the world.

But, however sweet dreams may be, the realities are there and, on the basis of whether or not one takes them into account, policy can be a rather fruitful art or a vain utopia.

. . . today, to speak only of the economic domain, the report that was addressed on September 29 by the Commission in Brussels to the six governments shows with the greatest clarity that the present Common Market is incompatible with the economy, as it now stands, of Britain, whose chronic balance-of-payments deficit is proof of per-

manent disequilibrium, and which involves—as to production, to food supply sources, to credit practices, to working conditions—factors which that country could not change without modifying its own nature.

A Common Market also incompatible with the way in which the British obtain their food, as much by the products of their agriculture, subsidized to the highest level, as by the goods purchased cheaply everywhere in the world, particularly in the Commonwealth, which makes it impossible for London ever really to accept the levies laid down by the financial regulation, which would be crushing to it. A Common Market also incompatible with the restrictions Britain imposes on the exporting of capital, which, to the contrary, circulates freely among the Six. A Common Market incompatible, lastly, with the state of the pound sterling as it has once again been brought to light by the devaluation, as well as by the loans that preceded and accompany it; the state of the pound sterling, also, combined with the character of an international currency which is that of the pound, and the enormous external liabilities weighing on it, would not permit Britain to belong, at this time, to the solid and . . . guaranteed society in which are joined the franc, the mark, the lira, the Belgian franc and the florin.

In these conditions, what could be the outcome of what is called Britain's entry into the Common Market? And if one wanted, despite everything, to impose it, it would obviously be the breaking up of a community that has been built and that functions according to rules that do not tolerate such a monumental exception. Nor would it tolerate the introduction among its main members of a state who, precisely owing to its currency, its economy and its policy, does not at present belong to Europe as we have started to build it.

For Europe to be able to counterbalance the immense power of the United States, it is necessary not at all to weaken, but to the contrary to strengthen the Community's ties and rules.

Certainly, those who, like me, have proved by their acts the exceptional esteem, attachment and respect that they hold for Britain, firmly desire to see her one day decide on and accomplish the immense effort that would transform her. Indeed, in order to facilitate things for her, France is quite ready to enter into some arrangement that, under the name of association, or under another name, would foster, starting right away, trade between the continental states on the one hand and the British, Scandinavians and Irish on the other. But for the British Isles really to be able to moor fast to the continent, a very vast and very far-reaching mutation is still involved. Everything depends, therefore, not at all on negotiations—which would be for the Six a march toward abandon. . . .

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of January, 1968, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Jan. 8—In Cairo, representatives to the Arab League postpone indefinitely the January 17 Arab summit meeting to "strengthen joint Arab action."

Cyprus Dispute

Jan. 4—The President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, announces that Turkish Cypriotes may now enjoy full freedom of movement: he promises to eliminate all checkpoints.

Disarmament

Jan. 18—At the 17-nation Geneva Disarmament Conference, the U.S. and Soviet delegations submit the complete draft of a treaty designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The controversial and heretofore blank Article III on international inspection and controls is filled in.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Jan. 19—In Bonn, British Foreign Secretary George Brown confers with West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt on French resistance to Britain's joining the Common Market. (See also *France*.)

Korean Crisis

(See also *Korea, Republic of*)

Jan. 9—The North Korean news agency warns it will "smash . . . infiltrating boats carrying espionage elements" into its coastal waters.

Jan. 23—North Koreans board the U.S. navy intelligence ship *Pueblo* off Wonsan and take the ship and her 83-man crew into the North Korean port of Wonsan.

The U.S. Defense Department maintains that the *Pueblo* was cruising in international waters; the North Koreans charge that the boat was spying in territorial waters of North Korea.

Jan. 24—The North Korean radio broadcasts an alleged confession by Commander Lloyd Bucher of the *Pueblo* that he had violated territorial waters; the U.S. Department of Defense terms the statement a "propaganda sham."

Jan. 26—The U.S. asks the U.N. Security Council to secure the release of the *Pueblo* and the safe return of her crew from North Korea.

In a 4-minute television statement, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson asks North Koreans to end their "course of aggression" against South Korea and warns of the seriousness of their seizure of the *Pueblo*.

Jan. 27—North Korea says she will reject any U.N. resolution "concocted to cover up the United States imperialist aggression."

Following a Canadian suggestion, the Security Council begins private discussions on the *Pueblo* seizure.

Jan. 28—Interviewed while traveling in India, Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin declares he believes the *Pueblo* was in North Korean territorial waters when she was seized; he says the U.S. and North Korea must solve the problem themselves.

Middle East Crisis

Jan. 1—Some 500 Egyptian prisoners held by Israel are allowed to return to the U.A.R.

Jan. 3—The U.N. special representative in the Middle East, Gunnar V. Jarring, arrives in Israel for talks with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban.

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PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

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mere rhetoric and his only real policy is his détente by bilateralism.

This inference is confirmed when one considers the problem of how de Gaulle would implement a middle-range European policy. For even if his program were worked out in full and consistent detail, it is clear that it could not be implemented in the current diplomatic situation, as de Gaulle must be the first to know. Despite his keen sense for the crucial role of style in foreign policy, the French President has so alienated his allies that he has deprived himself of the support that would be necessary for the successful implementation of his European policies. He is suffering, in other words, from a diplomatic credibility gap. The suspicions of French motives nourished by repeated examples of de Gaulle's national egotism leads to the rejection of his policies sight unseen. Conscious of this impasse, de Gaulle seems to put his real effort into his direct relationships. No doubt he is amused to send the political pundits scurrying to their typewriters as they puzzle out his latest pronouncement on a reconciled Europe.

POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS

Gaullist rhetoric has created a most regrettable situation with regard to Europe. For one thing, it is frustrating the efforts of those who have concrete and workable middle-term proposals for general European reconciliation. For another, it prevents recognition of the positive contribution to the international situation of de Gaulle's overall Communist policy. For, despite the inherent limitations of his do-it-yourself approach to détente, General de Gaulle is the one Western statesman with the vision and the stature to call attention to the irrelevance of the cold war and to articulate policies in the perspective of post-cold-war dimensions. He is also taking concrete steps to create normalized links between the Communist countries and the West.

He is showing that, even if the major problems of the cold war cannot—for whatever reason—be solved in the immediate future, countries interested in détente can act independently and effectively on a bilateral basis. The meaning of this experiment for the world's many middle-sized powers is clear: if you cannot prevail on your local superpower to follow a rational post-cold-war policy, then at least do what you can yourself. Finally, it can be placed to de Gaulle's credit that, by his rapprochement with the Communist world and his associated policies, he has considerably shattered the united image of the Western, "imperialist" bloc, thereby reducing the threat from the West felt in the Communist and Third Worlds.

The specter of Gaullism will continue to haunt Europe. As far as the cold war is concerned we should hope that, rather than be exorcized, the specter will simply be reformed.

BOOK REVIEWS

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even those temporarily in the agnostic-Communist camp."

But, writes Aron, though de Gaulle has seen through "the obsolete ideologies of Russia and the United States," he has failed to develop "a coherent doctrine": thus de Gaulle has ended by undermining all efforts toward European union in the process of temporarily strengthening France.

Ronald Behling
Los Angeles State College

FRENCH COMMUNISM IN THE MAKING, 1914-1924. BY ROBERT WOHL. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966. 530 pages, \$12.50.)

To paraphrase one of Dr. Wohl's remarks, writers on matters Communist sin less by their distortions than by their dullness. His book is a brilliant exception. Heavily documented, highly detailed, closely reasoned, style, wit and judgment maintain the pace of a story that is often

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MEGALOCRACY IN FRANCE

(Continued from page 134)

tect its allies or deal effectively with its opponents. President Lyndon Johnson's proposal for fiscal reform and retaliation was an important first step in the right direction, but it should be followed by a massive campaign on all available political and economic fronts. Reducing tourist income in France will hurt the French, but not their President. Mere harrassment will needlessly poison relations between friendly peoples; only massive pressure will force the real issue into the open. Not only will we have to confront de Gaulle in Europe, but we should turn his Russian flank and outdeal him in Moscow. Obviously this would involve the kind of "agonizing reappraisal" we used to brandish at others, this time applied in reverse to our own policies. Nothing less—except an act of God—seems likely to save us from the General's machinations. And if the price seems high, the long-range results might be the best investment in peace and security we have made in 20 years.

A GREATER FRENCH COMMUNITY?

(Continued from page 150)

but the machinery is being used for a new purpose.

Far more in the public eye, however, has been a series of organizations that, like strands in a rope, have bound French-speaking Africa together. Thus there was the Union Africaine et Malgache (U.A.M.), which lasted from 1961 to 1964, and which linked 12 states together. Because it had excluded Algeria while fighting there was still in progress, it was closed down in favor of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). The O.A.U., however, recognized by the United Nations as a regional grouping, in the same way as the Organization of American States, is by no means under French control, but has, on the contrary, been Pan-African in conception. In February, 1965, however, a group resem-

bling the old U.A.M. came to life in an expanded form—the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (O.C.A.M.), although the treaty establishing it was not signed until 1966. Apart from O.C.A.M. itself, there have been a plethora of O.C.A.M. dependencies, mostly economic in character. In addition to O.C.A.M., there are various lesser regional groupings, such as the Conseil de l'Entente, grouping the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey and Togo, as well as a customs and economic groupings of the four former states of A.E.F.—Chad, the Central African Republic, the Congo-Brazzaville, and Gabon—known as the U.D.E.A.C.

UNWRITTEN TIES

Essentially, however, it is the unwritten ties linking French-speaking African states that are the strongest. A sign of their strength may be seen in Guinea's recent decision (almost ten years after she voted "no" in the 1958 referendum) to renew her links with France, a step that implies her reacceptance into the "Community." While France has not appeared in a hurry to renew the link, the circumstance is, nonetheless, significant.

At the present time one of the most important ties affecting French-speaking African states consists of the associate status that links most of them with the European Common Market, status which was formalized, after their independence, in the Yaounde Convention of 1964. The Convention, which applies to 18 African states, provides, *inter alia*, tariff reductions for them. The Convention expires on May 31, 1969, and negotiations for its renewal have, in effect, already begun. Two quite separate suggestions have been made in this connection. Firstly, it has been suggested that West Germany and the Netherlands might use the circumstance to exert leverage on France to ease her negative position on Britain's entry into the Common Market. (This, however, is not expected to happen, since France could exert counter-pressure by encouraging African governments to recognize East Germany). Secondly, it has been suggested that the renewed convention should provide for a commodity stabilization

fund for the associated (African) members, since in the past they have not gained much benefit from tariff preferences.

Meanwhile, consideration has been given to the establishment of what would in fact amount to a francophonic Commonwealth—a proposal that has been mooted, among others, by Presidents Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia. Such a step would take a stage further the decentralizing process that, apart from the granting of independence, was last in evidence in the *loi-cadre* of 1956, which decentralized power from the A.E.F. and the A.O.F. to the territorial level, i.e., that of the present independent states. Decentralization has its dangers, however, as the British example has shown. It can be carried so far that it becomes disintegration. Perhaps for this reason the Commonwealth concept does not seem to have found great favor in France herself.

Additional dangers to the working of the present association also lurk. With the passing of de Gaulle from power, and a less steady hand on the tiller of the French ship of state, as well as the ending of the Vietnamese war and other similar events that must all inevitably occur, psychological, political and economic changes affecting French Africa are to be expected. The Pan-African movement, temporarily halted, if not in a state of shock, may at some stage renew its momentum. Geography, also, may be expected to have its word. Already, for example, a West African Common Market is in prospect. Furthermore President Senghor of Senegal in 1967 remarked that it was time to see the English and French languages as “treasures supplementing each other and not as combat weapons.”

If such an attitude becomes general it might further dilute the strength of a uniquely francophonic concept. In effect, France has indeed made her mark upon Africa, and will continue to contribute to its development. But, as was said at the outset, times change—and, moreover, keep changing. In France, as in Africa itself, yet another length of history's scroll, is soon to come into view.

FRANCE AND THE U.S.

(Continued from page 159)

Greeks, Arabs, Kurds and Somalis (none of them a major threat to the United States). Other areas of the world—Indonesia, South-east Asia, most of Africa, and the Arab world—will be left by the Superpowers fairly much to their own chaos, on the grounds that their economic and political problems are largely irremedial at their present cultural levels. Europe, if it obtains a union of most of West Europe, including France and Britain, will be a Superpower also, as independent of the United States as it is of Russia, and the United States will probably be so harassed by its problems at home and in Latin America that its world commitments outside this hemisphere will be restricted chiefly to its three friends in the Far East and to three in the Near East and to its desperate effort to maintain control of the oceans, especially control beneath the surface of those oceans.

THE FRENCH ECONOMY

(Continued from page 142)

lion farms in 1977 employing 10 per cent of the active population (18 per cent now), and producing three times the volume compared with the turn of the century. That should bring French agriculture up to par with the agriculture of, say, Holland, but it will be a long and hard and very bitter road. The French price-support program is no better and no worse than the American (which, incidentally, is no compliment). The good farms are as good as any, anywhere, but they are numerically swamped by the dwarfs.

The Communists, who have been unable to appeal to increasingly affluent urban workers, see in all this a chance to reinvigorate their party of malcontents. It will take more than the present 11 per cent of state expenditure to contain the problem within politically manageable proportions, and de Gaulle is resolved to do it.

And so, the France of de Gaulle is headed toward modernization and the affluent society, with all that this implies in troubles and tribulations. France has a dynamic society, wide awake to French problems, and taking them in stride in a manner offensive to some and not palatable to all. Whatever they are, France's aches and pains are not those which in the interwar years had made of this nation the sick man of Europe. One may harbor serious misgivings and reservations about the economic philosophy underlying the government's programs and about the precise shape of de Gaulle's economic policies, but not about the resolve with which these policies are being applied. And this is something new in recent French economic history.

THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS

(Continued from page 171)

The call for a *relance* or renewed spirit has been issued, but the differences of the member states over expansion and the future role of the organization apparently have been evaluated as fundamentally unalterable. Problems continue, including the possibility of a common currency, and the renegotiation of agricultural finance regulations.

West German statesman Walter Hallstein is correct in warning the Five against imagining that they can go it alone and he is probably right in assuming that Britain will become a member—around 1980. But time will not automatically solve the disputes. The immediate problems are not on the table, and the multiple crises of the Six have led to a slowing-down process in the previously swift thrust forward toward complete economic union and toward any plans for political unity.

West Europe may have reached the decisive year in its short but essentially triumphant history. To save themselves from further fragmentation, the Six must strengthen their own solidarity and increase the tightness of their own integration. The customs union of the Six should be completed by July 1, 1968, but no common monetary,

social or comprehensive economic policies have been formulated. The entire stalemate has many causes, but foremost are the adamant personality of de Gaulle and the steadfast position of France, combining to cast a dark shadow over the West European integration efforts to build a greater Europe.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 178)

depressing or sordid, but is never dull.

The account details a precariously "united" Left disintegrating under the experience of a war it had ideologically rejected and patriotically accepted; the brusque but uncertain rise of a Communist party in France; and the process whereby French communism, increasingly subjected to Moscow, retained the characteristics of peculiarly French traditions and circumstances. The clash of personalities and ideas is shown not only in Paris but in Moscow too—the fortunes of French party struggles hanging on greater debates taking place in Moscow where, over and over, the orthodoxies of one day become the heresies of another, with the French Communist leadership using foreign references to bolster itself only to find this turning against it. "After January, 1923, a French Communist was a man who obeyed automatically when Moscow commanded." How this came to be—how a federation of individualists turned (and was turned) into a highly centralized organization, how the middle-class intellectuals who made the Communist party unmade themselves in the process, bringing proletarians into the leadership, centralizing and bureaucratizing the party and placing its organization under the control of Moscow whose first act would be to shuffle or sweep them out—how all this happened, Dr. Wohl makes beautifully clear.

An important book: not easy, but essential to students both of France and of communism.

E.W.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

(Continued from page 177)

Jan. 5—At the United Nations, Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol confers with U.N. Secretary General U Thant.

Jan. 8—In a border conflict, Israeli jets attack Jordanian positions on the east bank of the Jordan River, from which Jordanian forces fired on 2 west bank border villages.

Authoritative sources in Haifa report that Israel is putting into production a number of patrol boats to be called the *Saar* class, to counter the threat from the U.A.R.'s *Komar*-class gunboats, one of which sank the Israeli destroyer *Elath* 3 months ago.

Jan. 11—The International Committee of the Red Cross announces that Israel and the U.A.R. will transact a general exchange of prisoners of war.

Jan. 12—Sources close to the Red Cross International Committee report that 700 U.A.R. prisoners were exchanged today for 2 Israelis held by the U.A.R.

Jan. 20—Following 3 days of closed meetings in Cairo by representatives of 8 Palestinian commando organizations, a spokesman for the groups, Isam Sartawi, declares that the 8 have agreed to coordinate their anti-Israeli guerrilla operations through a joint command.

Jan. 24—A U.A.R. spokesman reports that on January 27, the first large-scale step to clear the Suez Canal will begin.

Jan. 25—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan announces agreement on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal.

Jan. 30—Egyptian and Israeli troops fire on one another across the Suez, as Egyptians begin to clear the Canal to free 15 ships caught there since the June war. The clearance project is temporarily abandoned.

United Nations

(See *Intl, Korean Crisis, Middle East Crisis*)

War in Vietnam

(See also *Cambodia, U.S.S.R. and U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 2—The 36-hour New Year's truce ends at 6:00 A.M.

Jan. 3—The North Vietnamese 2d Division attacks 2 U.S. artillery bases in the Queson Valley south of Danang. The Danang air base is also attacked.

Jan. 4—In Paris, the North Vietnamese diplomatic mission reiterates North Vietnam's December 30, 1967, proposal to discuss "relevant problems" with the U.S. if the U.S. will "first unconditionally stop bombing and all other acts of war" against North Vietnam.

Jan. 7—According to The Associated Press, Communist China has accused U.S. planes of attacking a Chinese freighter in the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong on January 3; several crewmen were wounded.

Jan. 11—In Washington, a U.S. navy source reports that in 1967 U.S. and Australian warships sank some 1,400 North Vietnamese vessels heading toward the 17th parallel and interrupted the flow of enemy supplies.

Jan. 13—From Saigon, reliable sources report that U.S. planes have been bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos to cut North Vietnamese truck traffic. (See also *Laos*.)

Jan. 15—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk issues a statement reassuring South Vietnam that the decision on possible future peace talks will not be made without South Vietnamese participation.

South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, speaking in Saigon, asserts that any attempt at peace talks "should be made by the Government of Vietnam as the principal party. . . ." He declares that South Vietnam reserves "the right of pursuit" of enemy forces crossing the border to take refuge in Cambodia.

Jan. 20—Near Dakto, fighting rages for a 2d day as U.S. soldiers try to repel North Vietnamese forces from a fortified hilltop.

Jan. 21—According to *The Observer* (London), U.S. reconnaissance photographs indicate that the U.S.S.R. may have shipped surface-to-surface missiles to Haiphong harbor; until now, Soviet vessels are believed

to have unloaded only antiaircraft missiles.

Jan. 24—At the end of a 3-day visit to the U.S.S.R. by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, a joint Soviet-British communiqué is issued urging a political solution of the war in Vietnam.

Jan. 25—The U.S. marine base at Khesanh is hit by North Vietnamese rockets. Yesterday, U.S. marine spokesmen estimated that some 35,000 enemy forces have been massed within 10-20 miles of Khesanh.

Jan. 27—The week-long cease-fire in celebration of *Tet*, the Lunar New Year, called by the Vietcong, begins. The 2-day allied cease-fire will commence on January 29, the day before *Tet* begins.

North Vietnamese forces shell Khesanh.

An official spokesman of the U.S. command in Saigon confirms that 15,000 U.S. troops are being rushed to the northern part of South Vietnam; U.S. Commanding General William Westmoreland declares that "the North Vietnamese Army has mounted a sizeable invasion from the demilitarized zone and from Laos."

Jan. 29—U.S. officials disclose that the Administration has informed North Vietnam that it will stop the bombing if Hanoi will not take advantage of the move to raise the infiltration into South Vietnam beyond "normal" levels.

Jan. 31—After 6 hours of fighting, Vietcong terrorists are routed from the U.S. Embassy in Saigon; the attack, part of a concerted series of Vietcong attacks on provincial capitals and other major cities in South Vietnam, began yesterday.

AFGHANISTAN

Jan. 7—Yugoslav President Tito arrives for a 4-day visit.

AUSTRALIA

Jan. 10—Senator John G. Gorton is sworn in as Australian Prime Minister, succeeding interim Prime Minister John McEwen. Yesterday, Gorton was elected as the Liberal party leader.

AUSTRIA

Jan. 17—The ruling People's party reshuffles 5 cabinet posts; Vice Chancellor and Minister of Trade Fritz Bock is replaced. Hermann Withalm becomes Vice Chancellor; Otto Mitterer is Trade Minister.

CAMBODIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 4—The government receives 11 planes (including 3 MIG-17 jet fighters) and several dozen antiaircraft guns from Communist China.

Jan. 8—U.S. Ambassador to India Chester Bowles arrives in Pnompenh.

Jan. 10—Following a 90-minute meeting with Bowles, Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk declares that they have agreed to ask the International Control Commission (I.C.C.) "actively [to] investigate all frontier incidents and all possible infiltrations of foreign troops. . . ."

Jan. 11—The North Vietnamese press agency reports that North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh has declared that North Vietnam will come to the aid of Cambodia in the event of a U.S. attack.

Jan. 15—The I.C.C. for Cambodia meets in Pnompenh to discuss Sihanouk's request that the I.C.C. strengthen its ability to supervise Cambodia's borders.

Jan. 17—Yugoslav President Tito arrives for a state visit.

Speaking at a dinner for Tito, Sihanouk charges that the U.S. has disregarded promises made by Bowles and is instead continuing to carry out military operations inside Cambodia.

Jan. 19—An Information Ministry statement charges that U.S. and South Vietnamese troops crossed into Cambodia yesterday; 3 Cambodians were killed and 2 wounded.

Jan. 22—The U.S. State Department Press Officer, Robert J. McCloskey, admits that U.S. and South Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia on January 18; he declares that the U.S. has expressed regrets about Cambodian casualties.

Jan. 29—A new cabinet, headed by Pen Nouth, adviser to Prince Sihanouk, is approved by the National Assembly. The Prince, who remains Chief of State, gave up the post of head of the government last week.

CHILE

Jan. 7—President Eduardo Frei Montalva regains control of the Christian Democratic party from a leftist faction which gained control of the party last June. Frei wins a 278-202 vote of confidence and a pledge to support his reform program, including his forced savings plan.

Jan. 30—Frei, under strong pressure, drops his forced savings plan.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Jan. 24—A new purge is hinted as all Peking newspapers carry an editorial by party Chairman Mao Tse-tung stating that some deceptive revolutionary leaders remain in power. Reports from Peking disclose an increased number of troops on patrol.

Jan. 25—Peking radio reports that U.S. planes violated China's air space today and yesterday.

COLOMBIA

Jan. 19—The governments of Colombia and the Soviet Union announce resumption of diplomatic relations after a 20-year lapse.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Kinshasa)

Jan. 4—Arriving from Ghana, U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey is greeted by the 1st anti-American demonstration on his African tour.

Jan. 11—The government announces it has ended diplomatic relations with Rwanda because Rwanda will not extradite the 121 white mercenaries to stand trial in the Congo.

CUBA

Jan. 2—On the 9th anniversary of the Cuban

revolution, Premier Fidel Castro announces that a serious fuel crisis will require strict control of petroleum consumption.

Jan. 12—It is announced that a second strong oil deposit has been struck 20 miles from Havana near one found earlier this week.

Jan. 19—Cuba halts the delivery of all parcels from overseas following the explosion January 9 of a parcel containing a bomb, allegedly mailed from the U.S.

Jan. 22—José Ramon Machado Ventura is replaced as Health Minister by Eliodoro Martinez Jonco, former deputy minister and second secretary of the Communist party in Havana province.

Jan. 24—An official reference to Premier Castro as General Secretary of Cuba's Communist party, instead of First Secretary, sets off rumors of a change in top party leadership. The reference appears in the official Communist organ *Granma*.

Jan. 28—The Central Committee of the Communist party announces that 9 members of a pro-Soviet faction of the party will be tried by a revolutionary court as "traitors to the revolution." Included is Anibal Escalante, a veteran Communist.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Jan. 1—In his annual New Year's address, President Antonin Novotny announces concessions to the Slovak minority and to the intellectuals.

Jan. 5—CTK, the official press agency, announces that Novotny has been deposed as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party, a post he has held since 1953; he retains the title of President. Alexander Dubcek, a Slovak, is elected First Secretary.

DENMARK

(See also *U.S., Military*)

Jan. 23—Dissatisfied with rising prices and taxes, the Danish people defeat the Social Democrats after 15 years of rule. Three non-Socialist parties, the Radical Liberals, Conservatives and Agrarian Liberals, win

enough parliamentary seats (101) to form a new government.

Jan. 24—Premier Jens Otto Krag gives his resignation to King Frederik IX; the King requests him to remain as caretaker premier.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Jan. 20—In Miami, Florida, Brigadier General Elias Wessin y Wessin announces he will run for the presidency of the Dominican Republic in 1970.

ETHIOPIA

Jan. 6—Addressing 500 diplomats and dignitaries in Africa Hall, Organization of African Unity headquarters, U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey pledges U.S. support for African regional organizations, for self-determination and for majority rule.

Earlier, Humphrey met with Emperor Haile Selassie.

FINLAND

Jan. 16—Urho Kekkonen is elected to a 3d 6-year term as president.

FRANCE

Jan. 1—The government institutes the added-value tax, a tax levied on a businessman's margin of profit.

President Charles de Gaulle meets with Jacob Kaplan, the Grand Rabbi of France, and assures Kaplan that his November 27 remarks about the Jewish people were not intended as an insult to the Jews. (See pp. 175 ff. of this issue.)

Jan. 6—Concluding a conference with U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Finance Minister Michel Debré announces French endorsement of the new U.S. policy of curbing the outflow of dollars.

Jan. 8—A French embassy official in Bonn confirms rumors that France will withdraw 5,000 troops from the 60,000 French troops stationed in West Germany.

Jan. 17—The government says that Britain should seek associate membership in the E.E.C.

Jan. 24—The government pumps the equivalent of \$675 million into the economy, raising family allowances for the poor, reducing personal income taxes and increasing old-age pensions. Expanded tax incentives and credits for public and private investments are ordered and an increase in the public housing program is planned.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *U.S.S.R.* and *Southern Yemen*)

Jan. 2—Answering an East German demand for payment of a \$245-million bill for postal and teletypewriter services, accumulated since the partition of Germany, West German Postal Minister Werner Dollinger offers a \$5-million preliminary payment for 1967.

Jan. 31—Yugoslavia and West Germany reopen diplomatic relations after a 10-year lapse.

GHANA

Jan. 3—U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey arrives in Accra and meets with Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah, the chief of state, and J. W. K. Harlley, the deputy chairman of the National Liberation Council. Humphrey and Harlley sign an agreement providing for some \$12 million in Food for Peace shipments from the U.S. to Ghana.

GREECE

(See also *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 7—Former Premier Constantine Kollias returns to Greece from Rome where he had fled after King Constantine's abortive December 13, 1967, coup. Kollias reports that the King has consented to his return and that he will resume his post as chief prosecutor for the state.

Jan. 18—In a government-authorized editorial, *Estia*, Athens' afternoon newspaper, accuses U.S. Ambassador to Greece Phillips Talbot of engineering Constantine's December coup. U.S. State Department officials deny Talbot had had any contact with Constantine.

Jan. 24—According to informed sources, 7 army leaders holding government positions resign their army posts, resulting in an all-civilian regime.

Jan. 25—A decree issued in the form of a constitutional amendment provides for the dismissal of all state officials who backed the King's coup. The move includes Kollias, who will not be allowed to hold the post of chief prosecutor.

GUATEMALA

Jan. 16—Two military attachés of the U.S. Embassy are killed and a U.S. army sergeant and a naval petty officer are wounded while driving near Guatemala City.

Jan. 17—It is reported that a major Communist group operating in Guatemala claims responsibility for slaying the 2 Americans.

GUINEA

Jan. 3—Returns from the January 1 presidential election confirm Sékou Touré as president for another 7-year term. Touré was the only candidate in the election.

INDIA

Jan. 2—The leader of Kashmir's Muslims, Sheik Mohammed Abdullah, receives full freedom from the Indian government. In his first public utterance in 32 months, he declares the reconciliation of India and Pakistan to be "his main concern."

Jan. 13—Student riots in Madras force the closing of all schools and colleges. Students are demanding the retention of English along with Hindi as an official language.

Jan. 22—President Tito of Yugoslavia arrives in New Delhi to confer with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Jan. 25—Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin arrives in New Delhi to "further friendly relations and business-like cooperation" between his country and India. The state visit will last 6 days.

IRAQ

Jan. 6—A Soviet-built atomic reactor to be

used for peaceful purposes is inaugurated by President Abdel Rahman Arif.

Jan. 13—The ministers of state, labor, education, health, economy and youth resign. President Arif names new ministers.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 2—The government submits to the *Knesset* (parliament) a \$2-billion budget, of which \$600 million is for defense spending.

Jan. 10—The Defense Ministry extends compulsory military service from 30 to 36 months, to ease burdens on reservists and lessen economic dislocation.

Jan. 11—The government expropriates 838 acres of the former Jordanian sector of Jerusalem. Private land owners, holding about 225 acres, will be compensated.

Jan. 21—The Rafi, Mapai and Ahdut Haavoda parties merge as the Israel Labor party, holding 59 of the 120 *Knesset* seats.

JAPAN

Jan. 31—Premier Eisaku Sato tells the *Diet* (parliament) any visit by a nuclear-armed submarine must be approved under the prior consultation clause in the United States-Japan defense treaty.

JORDAN

(See *Pakistan*)

KOREA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl, Korean Crisis; Korea, Republic of*)

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, Korean Crisis*)

Jan. 21—Thirty-one armed North Koreans infiltrate into Seoul and attack police and civilians; 5 infiltrators are killed and 1 captured.

Jan. 22—Captured North Korean army officer Kim Shin Jo discloses that the infiltrators' aim was to assassinate President Chung Hee Park.

LAOS

Jan. 7—In Nambac, an isolated area north of Luang Prabang, the royal capital, Royal Laotian forces intensify their efforts to defeat the Communist Pathet Lao forces. They are aided by U.S. G-123 planes dropping ammunition and rice.

Jan. 13—Laotian troops are defeated by Communist insurgents at the government-held enclave of Nambac. Finance Minister Sisouk Na Champassac charges North Vietnamese planes bombed Nambac on January 12.

Jan. 19—In Vientiane, officials report that 12 North Vietnamese battalions are pursuing some 2,000 Laotian government soldiers fleeing from Nambac.

Jan. 24—Premier Souvanna Phouma says his government is opposed to the construction of an electronic barrier across the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos. He also denies reports of American B-52 bombing raids on the trail. (See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*.)

LIBERIA

Jan. 1—U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Thurgood Marshall attend President William V. S. Tubman's 6th presidential inauguration. Humphrey arrived yesterday.

MALI

Jan. 16—The National Assembly resigns and places all powers in the hands of President Modibo Keita, citing the "revolutionary situation" existing in the republic since July.

MEXICO

Jan. 13—The government announces a \$2-billion program for public investment for 1968. Expenditures for agriculture will be 40 per cent higher than last year. The over-all program aims to keep the country's economy growing by 6.5 per cent a year.

NIGERIA

Jan. 1—Heavy fighting is reported between federal Nigerian troops and secessionist

Biafran military forces at Calabar, Enugu and Nkalagu.

Jan. 5—The head of the federal government, Major General Yakubu Gowon, pledges to halt fighting against secessionist troops if Ibo leaders respond positively to his offer for negotiations.

Jan. 29—Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of Biafra, calls for a cease-fire and "unconditional negotiations."

PAKISTAN

Jan. 1—President Mohammad Ayub Khan accepts Foreign Minister Sharifuddin Pirzada's resignation.

Jan. 14—Yugoslav President Tito, who arrived yesterday, meets for 3 hours with Ayub Khan.

Jan. 26—Jordanian King Hussein arrives for a 10-day state visit.

PORTUGAL

Jan. 19—A well-known novelist and columnist, Urbano Tavares Rodrigues, is arrested by the police, bringing to 3 the number of Socialist opposition leaders arrested in recent weeks. Yesterday, Francisco Sousa Tavares, a liberal Catholic leader and lawyer, was arrested. No reason is given for the arrests. (See *Portugal, Current History*, February, 1968, p. 123.)

SINGAPORE

Jan. 13—Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew arrives in London hoping to persuade the British government to delay the withdrawal of its military forces. The present deadline is the end of 1971.

Jan. 17—Development of "Israeli-style" armed forces for Singapore is announced by Lee Kuan Yew in London, following the failure of his plea to the British to extend their deadline.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

Jan. 26—In Pretoria, 30 Ovambo tribesmen from South-West Africa are found guilty of terrorism, but will not be executed.

SOUTHERN YEMEN, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Jan. 28—An official West German delegation arrives to study Southern Yemen's economic aid requirements.

SPAIN

Jan. 11—Demonstrating students at the University of Madrid set fire to a bus and stone firemen attempting to extinguish the blaze. The students are protesting the closing of the College of Political and Economic Sciences.

Jan. 12—A 4-month prison sentence is announced for 5 leading members of an opposition labor movement. The men are charged with holding an unauthorized meeting in a church hall in April, 1967.

Jan. 24—The Spanish Foreign Ministry requests assurances that United States ships will no longer touch at Gibraltar. Other Spanish Mediterranean ports will be closed to American vessels unless Gibraltar is bypassed.

SWEDEN

Jan. 12—A special parliamentary commission reports that Communists are increasing their attempts to obtain key posts in defense and police forces.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Intl, Korean Crisis, War in Vietnam; India*)

Jan. 5—In a note delivered directly to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the government protests the serious damage done to a Soviet merchant vessel while the United States was bombing the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong yesterday.

Jan. 6—The United States assures the U.S.S.R. that in the future it will make every possible effort to avoid harming Soviet ships during air attacks.

Jan. 8—In Moscow, the trial of 4 young intellectuals begins. Arrested almost 1 year ago, they are charged with having taken part in anti-Soviet activities.

Jan. 10—An appeal, signed by 31 writers and scientists, is sent to the Moscow City Court

asking legal safeguards and full press information about the trial of the 4 intellectuals.

Jan. 12—The 4 intellectuals are sentenced to imprisonment or hard labor, ranging from 1- to 7-year terms.

Jan. 16—According to informed sources, on January 6 the Soviet government presented the West German government with an *aide-memoire* about Berlin. The Soviet proposal suggested that should West Germany wish to ease her relations with the East European governments she would have to reduce her political presence in West Berlin.

Yakov Malik is appointed Nikolai Fedorenko's replacement as chief representative to the U.N.

Jan. 17—It is reported from Washington that the U.S.S.R. and France agreed last week to a 3d joint space project providing for a Soviet moon-orbiting satellite to carry French equipment.

Jan. 26—A Soviet intelligence ship is reported shadowing the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier *Enterprise* off the South Korean coast.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Jan. 24—President Gamal Abdel Nasser appoints leftist Minister of Local Government Aly Sabry as head of the Arab Socialist Union, giving him increased national influence.

The Commander in Chief of Egyptian armed forces, General Mohammed Fawzy, is promoted to the post of minister of war.

UNITED KINGDOM, THE

(See also *Intl, E.E.C. and War in Vietnam*)

Jan. 5—The government renews diplomatic ties, cut in 1963, with Somalia.

Jan. 16—Speaking to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announces cuts in governmental spending by \$720 million for the fiscal year beginning April, 1968, and \$1 billion for the following year. He states that Britain will withdraw most military forces from east of Suez by 1971, and close her Singapore and Per-

sian Gulf bases by that year; she also cancels her order for 50 U.S. F-111 planes. Education reform is delayed from 1971 to 1973, when students must stay in school until the age of 16, not 15; welfare benefits will be given to only those most in need and medical patients will have to pay for prescriptions.

Jan. 17—Opening a 2-day parliamentary debate on the government's fiscal policy, Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins states he will soon raise taxes to curb private spending.

Jan. 18—With the Conservatives and 25 Labourites abstaining, the government wins a vote of confidence (304-9) in the House of Commons for its economic policy. The 9 opposing votes were cast by Liberals.

Jan. 20—Wilson suspends the 25 Labourites from the majority caucus in the House of Commons because they failed to back him in the January 18 vote.

Jan. 21—According to informed sources, the rulers of Persian Gulf sheikdoms have offered to carry the entire cost of maintaining British forces in the Gulf area.

Jan. 25—Britain and the Sudan resume diplomatic relations, after a 7-month break.

British Territories

Bahamas, The

Jan. 11—Marking its 1st year in power, the Lynden O. Pindling government asks Britain for full internal independence, but wants Britain to continue to handle the colony's external affairs and defense.

The white-dominated United Bahamian party files a minority report opposing independence.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Jan. 13—Officials of the Selective Service System announce an increase in the number of Negroes serving on local draft boards; at the close of 1966, 278 Negroes were serving on the nation's 4,080 boards; at the end of November, 1967, 594 Negroes were serving.

Jan. 24—President Lyndon B. Johnson asks Congress to pass the Administration-spon-

sored civil rights measure he has requested for 3 years, and not to be deterred by the "criminal conduct" of Negro rioters.

Ruling 5 to 2, the Florida Supreme Court nullifies Florida's 136-year-old prohibition on interracial marriage.

Economy

Jan. 1—The President places mandatory limitations on corporations' direct investments overseas and asks for other voluntary programs to restrict spending abroad, as protection for the dollar. The United States balance-of-payments deficit was \$3.4 to \$4.5 billion in 1967.

Jan. 16—The Department of Commerce reports that the gross national product rose in the 4th quarter of 1967 to an annual rate of \$807.6 billion. The GNP for the entire year 1967 is reported at \$785.1 billion.

Jan. 17—In his State of the Union message to Congress, the President asks for repeal of the law requiring that Federal Reserve notes be backed by 25 per cent in gold.

Jan. 25—The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the Consumer Price Index rose 3.1 per cent in 1967, to a record 118.2 in December, 1967 (1957-1959 base).

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam, Korean Crisis; Cambodia and U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 4—At a news conference, Secretary of State Dean Rusk says that the U.S. is checking through diplomatic channels on the sincerity and meaning of North Vietnam's latest proposal for talks.

Department of Defense officials report that the department's sales of arms abroad will total \$4.5 billion to \$4.6 billion in the next 3 years.

Jan. 5—The State Department reveals that Israel has received a U.S. bill for \$3.3 million for compensation of families of men killed when Israeli planes attacked the *Liberty*, an American naval vessel, on June 8, 1967.

Jan. 7—At his Texas ranch, President Johnson meets with Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol.

Jan. 11—Vice President Hubert Humphrey returns from a 9-nation goodwill trip to Africa.

In a joint communiqué, Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk and special U.S. envoy Chester Bowles (Ambassador to India) express agreement on steps to assure Cambodia's neutrality in the war in Vietnam. The U.S. pledges to try to avoid hot pursuit of enemy troops into Cambodia, but the issue is not settled.

Jan. 12—It is reported in Washington that the President has promised Eshkol more Skyhawk A-4 fighter-bombers.

Jan. 17—In his State of the Union message to Congress, the President indicates doubts that Hanoi has met his requirements for a cessation of bombing and opening of negotiations. He repeats that North Vietnam must not take advantage of a bombing halt to reinforce her positions.

Jan. 18—The State Department reveals a note received from the U.S.S.R. on January 12 saying the U.S.S.R. will "not remain indifferent" if U.S. troops cross the Cambodian border.

Jan. 23—The U.S. reopens normal diplomatic relations with Greece.

Jan. 25—After a trip to Vietnam, Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) charges the government of South Vietnam with corruption, "brazenly practiced," and declares that half the \$30 million annually given by the U.S. for refugee relief is pocketed by government officials and province chiefs in South Vietnam.

Jan. 26—Rusk assures the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administration will reconsider its use of electronic spy ships. Committee member Karl Mundt (R., S.Dak.) charges "bungling" in permitting the *Pueblo* to approach North Korean waters.

Jan. 27—Ships of the United States 6th Fleet are avoiding Spanish Mediterranean ports pending settlement of the dispute over use of Gibraltar. (See also *Spain*.)

Government

Jan. 1—President Johnson names the Chair-

man of his Council of Economic Advisers, Gardner Ackley, as ambassador to Italy, replacing George Frederick Reinhardt.

Jan. 2—The President says he plans to promote Council member Arthur M. Okun to the chairmanship of the Council of Economic Advisers.

The President signs 4 bills increasing G.I. benefits, and a comprehensive omnibus Social Security bill raising 24 million persons' pensions at least 13 per cent, and raising 78 million persons' taxes. He criticizes the bill's new restrictions on welfare payments.

Jan. 3—President Johnson names Merton J. Peck as a member of the Council of Economic Advisers.

Jan. 7—Increased postal rates become effective; first class letter rates rise from 5¢ to 6¢ an ounce.

Jan. 8—The resignation of Charles L. Schultze as Director of the Bureau of the Budget is announced; Charles J. Zwick, assistant budget director, is to succeed him.

Jan. 15—The 2d session of the 90th Congress convenes.

Jan. 17—In his nationally televised report to Congress on the State of the Union, President Johnson proposes a \$186-billion budget, a manpower training program, a federally subsidized housing program, a tax surcharge, and removal of the "gold cover." (See also *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*.)

Jan. 19—President Johnson names Clark Clifford to succeed Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense, effective March 1.

Jan. 20—The White House announces a cooperative private-federal health and housing program to improve facilities for the urban poor, especially the elderly, under the sponsorship of the National Medical Association. A pilot project will begin in the District of Columbia. Negro doctors make up 97 per cent of the new organization.

Jan. 25—John W. Gardner resigns as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, effective March 1.

Jan. 29—President Johnson presents an \$186.1-billion budget to Congress, an in-

crease of \$10.4 billion above the 1968 fiscal year.

Labor

Jan. 11—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that major wage and fringe benefits raised labor costs by 5.6 per cent in 1967.

Jan. 26—Three General Motors foundries are closed because of strikes and resultant parts shortages.

Jan. 28—United Automobile Workers vote to end 2 of the 3 General Motors foundry strikes; the 3d foundry, at Tonowanda, New York, is still closed.

Military Policy

(See also *Intl, Korean Crisis*)

Jan. 5—William Sloane Coffin, chaplain of Yale University, pediatrician Benjamin Spock and three others are indicted on charges of conspiring to urge young men to violate Selective Service laws.

Jan. 19—Defense officials report that in 1968 302,000 men will be drafted into the army; 383,000 were drafted in 1966.

Jan. 22—A B-52 bomber with 4 unarmed hydrogen bombs crashes off Greenland.

Jan. 23—Traces of radiation are detected on the surface of the ice off Greenland; the bomber has reportedly sunk into 800 feet of water.

Jan. 25—President Johnson calls 14,787 air force and navy reservists to active duty following the North Korean seizure of the U.S. espionage ship *Pueblo*.

Clark Clifford, presidential nominee for the post of Secretary of Defense, tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that he opposes stopping the bombing of North Vietnam at present.

Jan. 28—The Strategic Air Command discloses that parts of all 4 H-bombs lost on the ice off Greenland have been recovered.

Politics

Jan. 3—Minnesota's Democratic Senator Eugene J. McCarthy declares that he will enter the New Hampshire presidential primary election on March 12.

Jan. 4—Speaking at the Commonwealth Club of California, New York's Democratic Sen-

ator Robert Kennedy says he expects to support President Johnson for reelection.

Jan. 8—Alabama's national committeeman Eugene B. Connor says that the name of former Alabama Governor George Wallace will be placed in nomination at the Democratic National Convention in 1968.

The Democratic National Committee approves a resolution declaring its "understanding" that a state party sending a delegation to the national convention "undertakes to assure that voters in the state, regardless of race, color, creed or national origin, will have the opportunity to participate fully in party affairs."

Jan. 9—Robert Kennedy says he will not support Eugene McCarthy in the Democratic presidential primaries.

Jan. 12—In Hampton, Michigan Republican Governor George Romney opens his New Hampshire primary campaign.

Jan. 31—Former Vice President Richard Nixon officially enters his name in the New Hampshire Republican primary.

Science and Space

Jan. 9—Concluding the 7-year program preparing for manned flight to the moon, the Surveyor 7 spacecraft makes a soft, safe landing on the moon.

Jan. 22—The 16-ton, 2-part spacecraft that is planned for landing men on the moon is successfully placed into earth orbit in its first test.

Supreme Court

Jan. 15—In a unanimous ruling, the Court approves plans for the merger of the New York Central and the Pennsylvania Railroads, finding that the Interstate Commerce Commission had "properly and lawfully" authorized the merger in April, 1966.

Jan. 22—The Court affirms a June 2, 1967, federal district court decision upholding the constitutionality of a New York law requiring all teachers in public and tax-exempt private schools to take an oath to uphold the federal and state constitutions.

Jan. 29—The Court declares unconstitutional laws requiring gamblers to purchase \$50 tax stamps, and the National Firearms Act

requiring registration of sawed-off shotguns, machine guns and other regulated weapons, because the filing of such information is tantamount to confessions of guilt.

U.S. Territories: Samoa

Jan. 27—American Samoa's Governor Owen S. Aspinall asks for riot equipment to subdue clashes between South Korean and Chinese Nationalist fishermen, fighting in a wide area from Samoa to the Fiji Islands. American Samoa has been administered by the Department of the Interior since 1951.

URUGUAY

Jan. 11—The Soviet Union agrees to grant Uruguay a \$20-million loan for the purchase of industrial and farm machinery.

VATICAN

Jan. 8—Conservative Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani resigns from his watchdog role as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Pope Paul VI appoints Franjo Cardinal Seper, the Archbishop of Zagreb, Yugoslavia, to succeed Ottaviani.

Jan. 9—Arcadio Cardinal Larraona and Giacomo Cardinal Lercaro resign positions in the Curia. The Pope names Benno Cardinal Gut to replace them.

Jan. 15—The Pope appoints an American, Francis James Cardinal Brennan, to head the Roman Curia's Congregation of the Sacraments; he also appoints Massimilian Cardinal de Furstenberg prefect of the Congregation for the Eastern Church.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See also *Cambodia*)

Jan. 9—The North Vietnamese press agency reports that Cambodian Foreign Minister Prince Norodom Phourissara has returned to Cambodia from Hanoi, where he met with President Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Jan. 8—In the Danang produce market,

South Vietnamese national police arrest some 100 peasants staging a protest against the U.S. military presence and U.S. bombing.

The New York Times reports that yesterday the (South) Vietnamese Council of Roman Catholic Bishops issued a statement criticizing President Nguyen Van Thieu and urging an end to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

Jan. 14—It is reported that a group of Saigon lawyers, professors and intellectuals, have issued a paper on "How to End the War in Vietnam"; they propose a general election be held with the National Liberation Front (political arm of the Vietcong) free to participate.

Jan. 27—According to well-informed sources in Saigon, Major General Nguyen Duc Thang has resigned as deputy army chief of staff and leader of the pacification program. Thang is not allowed to leave the army. Major General Nguyen Van La will succeed Thang as deputy chief of staff.

YEMEN

Jan. 12—A 3-nation committee on Yemen—consisting of Iraq, Morocco and the Sudan—calls for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all foreign interference in Yemen's internal affairs.

Jan. 18—Yemeni republicans and royalists, called together by the tripartite committee, refuse to talk with one another. The committee temporarily refers the situation back to the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *Afghanistan, Cambodia, Germany, India and Pakistan*)

Jan. 12—*Tanyug*, the official press agency, discloses that 400 members of the Yugoslav Communist party organization have been expelled for opposing reforms liberalizing the party and economy.

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